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Municipal Bankruptcy:
When Doing Less Is Doing Best
by
C. Scott Pryor*
The recent narrative of municipal bankruptcies focuses on the power of
insolvent cities to reduce burdensome retiree benefit obligations.' From Or-
ange County to the cities of San Bernardino and Vallejo as well as Detroit, a
principal focus has been the power of cities to cut retirement benefits free of
the procedural and substantive roadblocks faced by non-municipal debtors.
But the story arc has changed with the filing by the City of Stockton. Stock-
ton did not move to reject any of its labor contracts and continued to pay the
California Public Employees' Retirement System all amounts due for pensions
present and future. Rather than its unions, Stockton's principal bankruptcy
antagonists were the holders of its municipal bond debt. Could it be that
Stockton, rather than adjusting its finances at the expense of its workers and
retirees, plans to do so to the detriment of its more distant creditors? Would
such a plan of adjustment be fair?
Risk is inherent in all economic transactions and all creditors should un-
derstand that they are exposed to a risk of nonpayment. As the identity of
creditors changes from bondholders to employees to retirees, however, actual
awareness of that risk decreases. More significantly, the power to protect
against that risk through use of the financial market diminishes. It is thus not
surprising that state law occasionally intervenes to reallocate risk through
the political process for the benefit of those less able to use the market.
Whatever the reason-economic or political-the interests of some creditors
are better protected from risk than others. On the one hand, the bankruptcy
process takes as a given this initial allocation of risk. On the other hand, the
*Professor of Law, Regent University School of Law. J.D. 1980, University of Wisconsin Law School.
M.A. 1997, Reformed Theological Seminary. I wish to thank the Regent University School of Law for its
financial support and Juliet M. Moringiello, David A. Skeel, Jr., Todd Zywicki, Max Stearns, Kenny
Ching, and James J. Duane for their valuable insights and suggestions and Amber Knipe for her important
research and editorial assistance. The final expression is, of course, mine alone.
'Int'l Bhd. Of Elec. Workers v, City of Vallejo (In re City of Vallejo), 432 BR. 262, 270-72 (E.D.
Cal. 2010); Ass'n of Retired Emps. of City of Stockton v. City of Stockton (In re City of Stockton), 478
B.R. 8, 23 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012); Peter Benvenutti et al., United States: An Overview of Chapter 9 of
the Bankruptcy Code: Municipal Debt Adjustments, MONDAQ (Aug. 23, 2010), available at http://
www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x//Insolvency+Bankruptcy/An+Overview+of+Chapter+9+ofmhe+
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85
86 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW JOURNAL
Bankruptcy Code permits this risk to be reallocated through the adjustment
process so long as that reallocation is "fair and equitable" and does not "dis-
criminate unfairly,"-bankruptcy fairness.
As if the notion of bankruptcy fairness were not complex enough, in or-
der to be confirmed a plan of adjustment must also be in the "best interests"
of creditors. Unlike bankruptcy fairness, best interests compares a plan's pro-
posed reallocation of risk to the hypothetical state of affairs that would have
obtained if bankruptcy had never taken place. The measure of fairness com-
prised in best interests is that of state law, not the Bankruptcy Code. This
element will be characterized as state-law fairness in the balance of this pa-
per. The phrase substantive fairness will compass fairness of both sorts-
bankruptcy and state-law.
Whatever confirmation of a plan of adjustment requires, the power of a
municipality to assume executory contracts permits reallocation of risk of
nonpayment away from the contract's counterparty free from immediate con-
sideration of substantive fairness. Assumption of executory contracts in
bankruptcy has been subject only to the business judgment rule, and substan-
tive fairness to other parties has not played a role in judicial review. When it
comes to assumption, bankruptcy courts have generally paid substantial def-
erence to the discretion of the management of the debtor. Some courts have
imposed a heightened standard on debtors seeking to reject contracts deemed
to have substantial public implications. No court, however, has imposed any-
thing other than the business judgment standard on decisions to assume. Can
assumption preempt substantive fairness?
The brevity of chapter 9 means that Congress hasn't provided a straight-
forward answer to these questions. The tension between congressional
power under Article I of the Constitution and the rights reserved to the
states by the Tenth Amendment subjects construction of chapter 9 to an
overlay of constitutional interpretation. The rarity of chapter 9 bankruptcies
entails that much judicial gap-filling remains to be done. This uncertain state
of affairs generates a powerful incentive among most parties to settle. Incen-
tives exist to resolve competing claims because a nonconsensual plan must be
fair in both the bankruptcy and state-law senses and because the contents of
substantive fairness are underdetermined. Chapter 9 thus functions to create
an institutional game of Chicken driving stakeholders to consensus.
This article will proceed in four parts. Part I will briefly consider the
circumstances leading to Stockton's bankruptcy, summarize relevant Califor-
nia law, and review the opinions thus far reported in its case. Part II will
consider public finance in contemporary America and its attendant risks as
well as their contractual and state-law allocation among various interested
parties. In Part III the question of whether a municipality can "unbundle"
assumption of certain contracts from plan confirmation will be addressed. Fi-
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nally, Part IV will examine several bankruptcy confirmation issues: What
protections do the twin requirements of "fair and equitable" and no "unfair
discrimination"-two aspects of bankruptcy fairness-and the mandate of
"best interests of creditors"-state law fairness-provide for creditors? And
what does it mean that a municipal plan of adjustment must not propose
actions prohibited by law? Finally, what should the bankruptcy court do
when these requirements collide?
I will examine these issues principally through the lens of the Stockton
bankruptcy. Although California law is integral to this analysis, the applica-
tions of my conclusions are not limited to California municipal bankruptcies.
Separation of contract assumption from plan confirmation should be relevant
to all municipal cases and the effects on public finance of disparate treatment
of pensions and other claims clearly have ramifications beyond the borders of
California. In any event, the many lacunae of chapter 9 and the paucity of
reported decisions on these issues creates an opening for new applications of
existing law and I hope this piece will spur creative and thoughtful considera-
tion of such uses.
I. THE (IM)MOVABLE OBJECT AND THE (IR)RESISTIBLE
FORCE
A. SETTING THE SCENE
The City of Stockton filed its chapter 9 petition on June 28, 2012. Stock-
ton's eligibility for relief was vigorously contested by two bond insurers, col-
lectively known as the "capital markets creditors," who had insured
Stockton's general obligation bonds.2 Unlike other chapters of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, entry of an order for relief under chapter 9 is not automatic.3
An entity must demonstrate the presence of five factors to be eligible for
chapter 94 and the capital markets creditors denied that Stockton met two of
them: good faith and insolvency.' In addition to the city itself, the California
Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS) strongly supported Stock-
2A third entity, Ambac Assurance Corporation, insured Stockton's participation certificates issued on
behalf of the city's public financing authority. Unlike the two capital markets creditors, however, Ambac
settled with Stockton without litigation. See Order Granting City of Stockton's Motion for Order Ap-
proving Compromise Pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9019, In re City of Stockton,
No. 12-32118 (Apr. 2, 2013), ECF No. 888. Two other bondholders, Franklin High Yield Tax-Free
Income Fund and Franklin California High Yield Municipal Fund, that had not taken an active role in the
Stockton bankruptcy, later took up the positions previously asserted by the capital markets creditors.
11 U.S.C. § 921(d).
4A municipality may be a debtor under chapter 9 only if (1) it is a municipality, (2) it is insolvent, (3) it
desires to make an adjustment of its debts, (4) it has negotiated in good faith with its creditors (or can
show that such negotiations would have been impracticable), and (5) it is specifically authorized by state
law to file for relief under chapter 9. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c).
'See In re City of Stockton, 493 BR. 772, 783-791 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013) (Stockton V) (addressing
Stockton's eligibility to be a debtor under chapter 9).
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ton's eligibility for relief under chapter 9. This support was not a surprise.
Prior to filing Stockton had made clear that it did not intend to terminate its
agreement with CalPERS and that it would not impair the claims of its retir-
ees whose pensions CalPERS administered. The bankruptcy court ultimately
ordered relief on April 1, 2013 after a three-day trial. The court's opin-
ion-Stockton V-is considered below.
Long before Stockton sought bankruptcy relief, it had agreed to provide
pensions and health-care benefits to its retirees, and had contracted with
CalPERS to administer those benefits.6 The financial burden of tliose bene-
fits on the city increased over the decades through what the bankruptcy
court characterized as an "encrustation of a creeping multi-decade, opaque
pattern of above-market compensation of employees." 7 From the outset, each
labor agreement contained some retirement benefits but over time those ben-
efits increased and thus Stockton's future obligations to its retirees also in-
creased. By the time it filed, the city provided generous lifetime healthcare
benefits regardless of the length of an employee's service.8 Its pension plans
permitted "add-pays" and "pension-spiking" that allowed employees to manip-
ulate their income for their final year of employment and thus increase the
pensions they would receive.9
Of course, Stockton also had current obligations to its employees who
provided services such as police and fire protection. Like its obligations to its
retirees, the cost of Stockton's labor agreements with its employees had in-
creased substantially until 2010, when it belatedly began to curtail its labor
costs. In the years immediately before filing, Stockton cut the number of its
employees from 1,886 in 2008 to 1,420 at the end of 2011.10 To complicate
'John Heilman, Edmund Edelman, & Thomas J. Clark, Health Care Issues for City and State Employees,
16 WHITTIER L. REV. 51, 56 (1995):
The California Public Employees Retirement System, or CALPERS, was originally
established in 1935 to administer the retirement program for state employees. Over
the years, the system has come to include employees of 900 other public agencies
such as cities, counties, and school districts. The system manages roughly $80 bil-
lion, depending on the state of the stock market. By doing so, CALPERS is the
largest retirement system in the country.
See also KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 2 (5th ed. 2010) (observing that
employee benefits were initially utilized primarily during World War II).
"Stockton V, 493 B.R. at 779.
8See id.
'Id. See John Giaia, Readers' Forum: Misguided Attempt to Top Pension Spiking, CONTRA COSTA
TIMES (Aug. 14, 2010), available at http://www.contracostatimes.com/opinion/ci_15770581; Maryjo
Webster et al., Public Pension Spiking Public Overtime Hours Soar for St. Paul Fire Supervisors, PIONEER
PRESs (Dec. 8, 2012), available at http://www.twincities.com/ci_22148782/public-pension-spiking-over-
time-hours-soar-st-paul?IADID=search-www.twincities.com-www.twincities.com (discussing techniques
of manipulation utilized to increase benefits under defined-benefit pension plans).
'oSee Stockton V, 493 BR. at 780.
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fiscal matters, the economic recession beginning in 2008 lead to a 50% decline
in property values as well as a substantial reduction in sales tax revenues."
Yet, there were no reductions in Stockton's obligations to provide services to
its residents.
The continuing subtext relating to Stockton's eligibility was the city's
stated intention not to reject its collective bargaining agreements and to pay
CalPERS. While the city and its unions had negotiated toward reduction of
current levels of staffing and liberalization of work rules,' 2 the city professed
that it did not intend to effect any changes in the pension benefits paid to
retirees." Stockton's "Ask," its 790-page prepetition proposal to creditors,
combined a promise of no impairment of pensions with a proposal for substan-
tial delays in its payments to bondholders. Driving home its preferences,
even before filing Stockton defaulted on its bond payments to relieve its cash
flow crisis.14 The city's prepetition default in payment to the capital markets
creditors and its decision to continue to pay CalPERS created a conflict be-
tween two financially powerful sets of parties battling to retain (or get) a
greater share of Stockton's future revenues. And, given that many other cit-
ies in the United States are experiencing fiscal pressures like Stockton's, what
happens in Stockton's bankruptcy case could have nationwide
reverberations.' 5
CalPERS charges each participating municipality an annual sum which,
together with anticipated investment returns, it projects to be sufficient to
pay retirees when their pensions are due.16 A municipality determines the
level of benefits it will pay, generally through a collective bargaining agree-
ment, and CalPERS determines the rate of contribution (and can change the
rate when its actuary deems it necessary). CalPERS thus has two roles in
Stockton's bankruptcy case. First, it stands in the shoes of Stockton's retired
employees whose benefits it pays. While the United States Trustee has ap-
"Id. at 780.
12Id. at 785.
"Id. at 779-80. Stockton also took the position that it could not negotiate with its retirees before filing
because they had no common representative with whom to negotiate. See id. at 794.
'
41d. at 78 1.
"The chapter 9 filing by the City of Detroit characterized by the city's proposal to pay substantially
less than due bondholders and retirees is the most current example. See Mary Williams Walsh & Steven
Yaccino, In Embattled Detroit, No Talk of Sharing Pain, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2013, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/06/18/business/in-embattled-detroit-no-talk-of-sharing-
pain.html?pagewanted=all. See also City of Detroit Proposal for Creditors 106-09, available at http://
www.freep.com/assets/freep/pdf/C4206913614.PDF (describing proposed replacement of current un-
secured debt with 'Limited Recourse Participation Notes" bearing interest at rate of 1.5% per year with
non-guaranteed principal payments).
16See CAL. Gov. CODE § 20532.
2014) 89
90 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW JOURNAL (Vol. 88
pointed an official committee of retirees in Stockton's case,' 7 the interests of
the retirees and CalPERS with respect to pension benefits coincided. Sec-
ond, in its capacity as plan administrator, CalPERS has the power to set the
amount of the annual contributions to be paid by municipalities that have
contracted for its services.' 8 In the early years of the twenty-first century,
CalPERS underestimated the ultimate costs of the benefits it administered.'1
Thus, since 2008, CalPERS has increased the assessments it makes on munici-
palities. 20 Even so, some argue that municipalities should be making greater
contributions if CalPERS is ultimately going to be able to pay all promised
benefits.21
Like most cities in the United States, Stockton's principal source of reve-
nue is real estate taxes. Stockton's sales and use tax revenues increased by
sixty-five percent between 2000 and 2006.22 Thereafter, according to the
Metropolitan Statistical Areas ranking, house prices in Stockton dropped
57.22% in the five-year period from 2008 to 2012,23 and the city's revenues
decreased thirty percent from fiscal year 2005-2006 to fiscal year
2009-2010. Stockton's city government did not believe it could close its
revenue shortfall by raising taxes because of California's well-known Proposi-
tion 13, which froze assessments for real property at their 1976 levels, set the
tax rate at 1% of that valuation, and limited annual increases to 2%.24 Com-
bined with Proposition 218, which requires that a majority of voters approve
new or increased general taxes,25 the ability of Stockton to generate new
revenue was severely limited.
Like other cities in the United States, Stockton borrowed money for vari-
ous purposes. Indeed, borrowing rather than taxing is a long-recognized prob-
1 Notice of Appointment of Official Committee of Retirees at 1-2, In re City of Stockton, No. 12-
32118 (Apr. 1, 2013), ECF No. 846.
iSIn addition, under California law CalPERS has the power to calculate the termination liability of a
municipality that withdraws from CalPERS's administration of its retirement benefits. See CAL. Gov.
CODE § 20574. The same provision also provides that CalPERS will have a lien on the assets of the
terminating municipality for the "actuarially determined deficit in funding for earned benefits" for its
employees.
"See Adam B. Summers, How California's Public Pension System Broke (and How to Fix It), REASON
FOUNDATION (June 2010), available at http://reason.org/files/californiapension.crisis reformstudy.pdf.
20Victoria Colliver, CalPERS OKs Jump in Health Co-Pays, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, May 17,
2007, at Cl, available at www.sfgate.com/business/article/CalPERS-OKs-jump-in-health-co-pays-
2560039.php.
2iSee also infra text accompanying notes 102-109 (discussing underfunding in general).
22Declaration of Laurie Montes in Support of City of Stockton's Statement of Qualifications under
Section 109(c) of the Bankruptcy Code at 8, In re City of Stockton, No. 12-32118 (June 29, 2012), ECF
No. 23.
231d. at Exhibit F, unnumbered page 32.
24CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, §§ 1(a) and 2(b).
25CAL. CONST. art. XIIIC, § 2.
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lem of political agency.26 By the time of its filing, Stockton owed over $250
million to bondholders. 27 Of this total, a substantial portion was due on reve-
nue bonds while the balance was for general obligation bonds. This distinc-
tion is particularly important in cases of municipal insolvency because
revenue from the sources of payment dedicated to revenue bonds repayment
cannot be used for any other purpose.28 A receiver was appointed to collect
the revenues from the parking garages and other assets pledged as collateral
for its revenue bonds even before Stockton filed bankruptcy. 29
From 2000-2007 the creditworthiness of most municipal borrowing was
enhanced by letters of credit, intra-governmental guaranties, or insurance. 30
The availability of insurance, however, has declined markedly since 2008.31
Two bond insurers are active in Stockton's bankruptcy-National Public Fi-
nance Guarantee Corporation and Assured Guaranty Corporation. 3 2 Indeed,
apart from the trustees for holders of its revenue bonds, virtually all of Stock-
ton's bondholders have been paid by the insurers. Thus, it is the insurers
who stand to lose relative to retirees if Stockton impairs their claims but does
not impair the pension claims of its retirees.
B. CALIFORNIA CODE AND CASES
When a municipality contracts with CalPERS to administer its retire-
ment obligation, CalPERS has the statutory authority to calculate the neces-
sary contributions.3 3  California courts have repeatedly held that the
retirement obligations due to public employees are immune from modification
under California statutes and the state constitution. 34 The California Con-
26See David A. Skeel, Jr., Is Bankruptcy the Answer for Troubled Cities and States?, 50 Hous. L. REV.
1063, 1072 (2013).
57See List of Creditors Holding 20 Largest Unsecured Claims, In re City of Stockton, No. 12-32118
(June 28, 2012), ECF. No. 4.
28See infra text accompanying notes 135-139.
"
9See Stockton V, 493 BR. at 782.
3oSee U.S. SEC. AND ExCH. COMM'N, STAFF REPORT ON THE MUNICIPAL SECURITIES MARKET ii
(2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/munireporto73112.pdf (the 'SEC REPORT").
"Id. at 49. Even though issuance of bond insurance and stand-by letters of credit have decreased, a
significant portion" of issuances of new municipal debt is enhanced by some form of governmental guar-
anty. Id. at 50. In other words, a higher governmental body guarantees payment of a security issued by a
lower governmental body, agency, or instrumentality, or of a private entity that benefits from conduit
financing. See also infra text accompanying note 85.
32The place Assured Guaranty, Ltd. and its affiliates occupied in the municipal bond insurance market
through 2009 is worth noting: "Through its two insurer subsidiaries, [Assured] commanded 100% of the
[bond insurance] sector . . . in the first quarter [of 2010] . . . ."). Patrick McGee, 'Assured All Alone on
Top," The Bond Buyer (Apr. 16, 2010), available at http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/l119321/assured
-quarterlyrankings-1010938-l.html.55See supra text accompanying notes 18-20.
34See, e.g., Betts v. Bd. of Admin., 582 P.2d 614, 617 (Cal. 1978) ("A public employee's pension consti-
tutes an element of compensation, and a vested contractual right to pension benefits accrues upon accept-
ance of employment. Such a pension right may not be destroyed, once vested, without impairing a
2014) 91
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stitution mandates that CalPERS "administer the system in a manner that
will assure prompt delivery of benefits and related services to the partici-
pants,"35 which the California Supreme Court takes to prohibit any down-
ward modification to public employee pensions. California cases have also
made clear the inviolability of benefits promised to public employees by hold-
ing that pension obligations existing on the date of an employee's hiring can-
not be substantively altered.36 Rights to benefits vest immediately upon
employment. 7 Any non-consensual changes may thus be accomplished-if at
all-only in bankruptcy.38 This strong set of entitlements under California
law constitutes the substance of state-law fairness protected by the best in-
terests test of chapter 9.
C. ROUNDS 1-5
As of this writing the bankruptcy court has issued five reported decisions
in Stockton's bankruptcy. None have resolved whether a plan that leaves
retiree pension obligations unimpaired but impairs the rights of bondholders
can pass the test of bankruptcy fairness, or whether the city may assume its
pension-related agreements over the objection of its creditors. Indeed, the
Bankruptcy Court has left open the issue of whether a plan leaving retiree
pensions unimpaired can be crammed down over the objection of impaired
creditors.39 The issue of bankruptcy fairness-the extent to which the prin-
ciple of pari passu must be applied-remains in play.
Collectively, however, these five opinions suggest a developing point of
view by the bankruptcy court with regard to bankruptcy fairness. Stockton
140addressed the city's motion to dispense with the confidentiality provisions
of California law relating to much of what had transpired during the statuto-
rily required prefiling neutral evaluation process.4 ' The limited disclosure
authorized by the court pertained to the factor of Stockton's good faith for
eligibility for relief under chapter 9. What was disclosed, however, had a
negative effect on the court's perception of the good faith of the capital mar-
contractual obligation."). See generally Amy B. Monahan, Statutes as Contracts? The "California Rule" and
Its Impact on Public Pension Reform, 97 IowA L. REv. 1029 (2012).
"CAL. CONST. ART. XVI, § 17(a).
6See Kern v. City of Long Beach, 179 P.2d 799, 802 (Cal. 1947) ("Since a pension right is 'an integral
portion of contemplated compensation,' it cannot be destroyed, once it has vested, without impairing a
contractual obligation" (citation omitted)).
"Betts, 582 P.2d at 617.
"CalPERS takes the position that benefits cannot be altered even in bankruptcy. See Statement of
Peter Mixon for CalPERS Board of Administration (September 12, 2012), available at http://
www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-docs/about/pubs/calpers-legal-position-municipal-bankruptcies.pdf
"Stockton V, 493 B.R. at 786.
401n re City of Stockton, 75 B.R. 720 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012).41Id.
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kets creditors.42 The court's conclusion that they had not negotiated in good
faith as required by California law could undercut any objection the capital
markets creditors might later make to unfair discrimination under a plan.
Stockton II43 raised several of the issues at the core of CalPERS/capital
markets creditors conundrum. Days after the filing, Stockton implemented a
budget that reduced retiree health benefits.44 The affected retirees promptly
objected. The court made short shrift of the retirees' constitutional attack,
i.e., that the Contracts Clause prohibits unilateral contractual changes.
While the court noted that the Constitution bars states from "impairing the
Obligation of Contracts,"45 it went on to observe that Congress has the
power to do so under the Bankruptcy Clause.46 The Supremacy Clause con-
firms this result even when a city, as an instrumentality of a state, is also
subject to a state constitutional prohibition prohibiting impairment of con-
tracts. 47 The Constitution makes the risk of insolvency part of the evalua-
tion of substantive fairness.
The opinion in Stockton II spent more time on the retirees' statutory
objection to reduction of their health benefits and affirmed a municipality's
near plenary power to reject executory contracts. Subject only to the
Supremacy Clause, sections 903 and 904 of the Bankruptcy Code protect a
state's Tenth Amendment sovereignty by, one the one hand, reserving to the
states power over their municipalities and, on the other, limiting the power of
the courts to interfere with a municipal debtor's expenditures.48 Section 903
specifically excludes the state's control of the "political or governmental pow-
ers" of the municipality from the bankruptcy court.49 Section 904 effectively
functions "as an anti-injunction statute" so the court in Stockton II concluded
that it lacked the judicial power to compel the city to continue to pay its
retiree health benefits regardless of the merits of the retirees' claims under
state law.50 At this stage, bankruptcy fairness trumped state-law fairness.
41See infra text accompanying notes 69-73 with respect to Stockton V.
4 3Ass'n of Retired Emps. of Stockton v. City of Stockton (In re City of Stockton), 478 B.R. 8 (Bankr.
E.D. Cal 2012).
"Id. at 14.
45U.S. CONsT., art. I, § 10, cl.L See Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978)
(invalidating legislation that retroactively altered private pension obligations); Unites States Trust Co. v.
New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977) (striking down legislation allowing state to alter terms of bond obligations
retroactively). But see Clayton P. Gillette, Bondholders and Financially Stressed Municipalities, 39 FORD.
URB. L.J. 639, 640-53 (2012) (describing variety of subconstitutional but effective ways of municipalities
to evade obligations to creditors).
46478 BR. at 15.
471d. at 16. See supra text accompanying note 35.
4
sId. at 16-17.
491 U.S.C. § 903 ("This chapter does not limit or impair the power of a State to control . . . a
municipality .. . in the exercise of the political or governmental powers of such municipality . . .").
s0478 B.R. at 22 (-Under any definition of a 365 executory contract, the plaintiffs' prior full perform-
2014) 93
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The balance of the opinion in Stockton II is significant for the conflict
between CalPERS and the capital markets creditors. First was the court's
commonplace observation that the "§ 365 executory contract provisions ap-
ply in chapter 9 cases by virtue of § 901(a)."5 1 More significant was the
court's conclusion that the city's obligations to its retirees are not executory
contracts: "Performance does not remain due to some extent on both sides-
there are no reciprocal obligations with performance due by both parties." 52
In other words, because the retirees no longer owe any duties to the city,
their interests in Stockton's bankruptcy are only as claimants, not executory
contract counterparties.53  Finally, Stockton II followed the majority of
courts and held that sections 1113 and 1114 of the Bankruptcy Code do not
apply in a chapter 9 case. Section 901(a) does not incorporate the provisions
of chapter 11 that afford additional protection to collective bargaining agree-
ments and retirement obligations54 Only the marginally heightened standard
of review of rejection of a collective bargaining agreement provided by the
Supreme Court in Bildisco" applies to a municipality.56 Congress has left a
greater risk of insolvency on municipal employees than on non-public union
workers.
The decision in Stockton III5 dealt with an extension of the automatic
stay to municipal officers during the pendency of a chapter 9 case. Stockton
IV58 demonstrates further extension of judicial deference to municipal deci-
sion-making. While its bankruptcy was pending, Stockton agreed to settle a
prepetition claim that its police officers had used excessive force in connec-
ance means they have no executory contract. . . . To the contrary, and it is hereby so held, § 904(2)
prevents this court from granting the relief requested in this proceeding.").
5Id. at 21.
52Id. at 22 (emphasis added).
"The court's implicit adoption of the Countryman test of executoriness will receive further discussion
in Part III.
54 See Orange Cnty. Emps. Assn. v. Cnty of Orange (In re Cnty. of Orange), 179 BR. 177, 182-83
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995); In re City of Vallejo, 432 B.R. 262, 270-71 (E.D. Cal. 2010); David S. Kupetz,
Municipal Debt Adjustment Under the Bankruptcy Code, 27 URB. LAw. 531, 534 n.11 (1995).
s
5 NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 526 (1984):
[T]he Bankruptcy Court should permit rejection of a collective-bargaining agree-
ment under § 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code if the debtor can show that the col-
lective-bargaining agreement burdens the estate, and that after careful scrutiny, the
equities balance in favor of rejecting the labor contract. The standard which we
think Congress intended is a higher one than that of the "business judgment" rule,
but a lesser one than that embodied in the REA Express opinion of the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.
56478 BR. at 23 ("The judicial consensus is that Bildisco controls rejection of collective bargaining
agreements in chapter 9 cases.").
sIn re City of Stockton, 484 B.R. 372 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012).
5 In re City of Stockton, 486 B.R. 194 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013).
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tion with a drug-related detention59 The city then moved for a declaration
that it need not seek bankruptcy court approval of the settlement.60 The
capital markets creditors objected to the contention that a municipality had
the unilateral power to settle disputed matters without complying with the
procedure provided in rule 9019 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Proce-
dure.61 Rule 9019, the creditors argued, provides the exclusive procedure by
which a debtor can compromise a claim. Rejecting their argument, Stockton
IV sustained the city's position that the Bankruptcy Code does not require a
municipality to comply with rule 9019: "[T]he bankruptcy court cannot pre-
vent a chapter 9 debtor from spending its money for any reason, even fool-
ishly or in a manner that disadvantages other creditors, unless the
municipality consents to such judicial oversight."62  Municipal freedom to
settle claims apart from judicial oversight deserves some explanation.
As a general rule, section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code 63 is the justifica-
tion for the requirement that debtors seek judicial approval of settlements.64
Consistent with the limitation of the bankruptcy court's powers under sec-
tion 904 of the Bankruptcy Code, section 901(a) omits section 363 from its
list of provisions operative in chapter 9. Thus, rule 9019 notice procedures
apply to a municipal debtor only to the extent it chooses to seek court ap-
proval of a settlement of a dispute.65 Apart from the city's choice to seek
judicial approval, neither a creditor nor any other stakeholder in a municipal
bankruptcy has standing to object to the settlement. The Tenth Amend-
ment concerns that animated congressional concern to keep the bankruptcy
courts out of the sphere of municipal government effectively allocates the risk
of decisions about current expenditures from a city to its stakeholders.
Stockton IV did not leave the capital markets creditors without any suc-
"Motion for Relief from Automatic Stay at 2, In re City of Stockton, No. 12-32118 (Oct. 23, 2012),
ECF No. 586.
60City of Stockton's Motion for Order (1) Ruling That Approval of Settlement Agreement is not
Required Under Rule 9019 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure; or Alternatively (2) Approving
Settlement Agreement Pursuant to Rule 9019 at 2, In re City of Stockton, No. 12-32118 (Oct. 23, 2012),
ECF No. 585.
61484 B.R. at 195.
62Id. at 198. The court grounded its decision on a review of the history of the Bankruptcy Act, the
Supreme Court's 1930s decisions in connection with Congress's first ventures into municipal bankruptcy,
and the plain meaning of section 904 of the Bankruptcy Code. In sum, as the court went on to observe,
" 904 means that the City can expend its property and revenues during the chapter 9 case as it wishes.
It can pay any debt in full without permission from the court." Id. at 199.
6311 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) ("The trustee, after notice and a hearing, may use, sell, or lease, other than in
the ordinary course of business, property of the estate . . . ").
64Michael P. Richman and Brian Smith, Should Rule 9019 Settlements be Treated as Property of the
Estate Subject to the Requirements of Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code?, 21 NORTON J. BANKR. L. &
PRAc. 1 Art. 2 (2012).
65484 BR. at 197 ("Rule 9019 applies in chapter 9 cases only if the debtor elects to 'consent' per § 904
to have the court consider approval of a compromise.").
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cor. Even though "the court cannot prevent or disapprove a settlement or
compromise,"66 a municipality's overreaching during the pendency of its chap-
ter 9 case may make ultimate confirmation of its plan more difficult. The
court's cautionary language is worth noting: "The capital market creditors
argue that unconstrained settlements amount to a creeping plan of arrange-
ment. Perhaps so. Perhaps such a creep is legitimate and sensible. Perhaps
nefarious. But, in any event, the day of reckoning comes at the plan confirma-
tion hearing."67 We will return to issue of "creeping confirmation" in Part
111,68 but here it is sufficient to note that bankruptcy fairness remains in play.
Risk shifting during the pendency of a chapter 9 case remains subject to the
confirmation requirement of substantive fairness.
Finally, nearly nine months after Stockton filed its petition for relief,
Stockton V 69 saw the court address the fundamental question of whether
Stockton was eligible to be a debtor under chapter 9. Despite vigorous oppo-
sition by the capital markets creditors, the court upheld Stockton's right to
be in chapter 9 and entered an order for relief. While acknowledging the
validity of criticisms of Stockton's prebankruptcy city government, 70 the
court went on to chastise the capital markets objectors in blunt terms, 7' spe-
cifically finding they had not negotiated in good faith as required by Califor-
nia law. 72 Yet as seen in Stockton IV, the court hedged its pro-city
conclusion by observing that the question of the city's relationship to
CalPERS remains an issue for confirmation.7 1 The court did not, however,
address the broader issue of Stockton's pension obligations to its retirees.
The ultimate relationship between state-law fairness and bankruptcy fairness
was left unresolved.
When the one-year anniversary of the Stockton chapter 9 passed, the
CalPERS/capital markets creditors conundrum remained unresolved. None-
66484 B.R. at 199.
67Id.
6
'See infra text accompanying notes 153-184.
6 9Stockton V, 439 B.R. 772.
701d. at 779 ("City accounts were in such disarray that it has taken literally years to unscramble them.
Various work rules were contractually agreed upon, often without approval in public view by the City
Council, that left little latitude for exercise of managerial supervision. And one wonders about what prior
City Councils had been doing.").
71See, e.g., id. at 787 ("[T]he decision makers for the capital markets creditors need to check their
testosterone at the door [and] stop assuming that they are spending their opponent's money when they
direct their counsel to pursue wasteful legal tasks . . . .").
72See id. at 786 ("[T]his court is persuaded by a preponderance of evidence that neither National
Public Finance nor Assured Guaranty negotiated in good faith during the California neutral evaluation
process.").
"Id. at 786 ("Although the CalPERS issue will become an important question if the objectors raise it
in a challenge to confirmation . . . ."). Indeed, the court had some choice words for CalPERS: "And
CalPERS itself has been bellowing and pawing the sidelines during the eligibility phase waiting for the
main event that will come only after relief is ordered." Id. at 797.
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theless, the set of published opinions suggested a weakened position for the
capital markets creditors. Stockton prevailed on each contested matter and,
while the court was careful to leave confirmation matters unresolved, the
breadth of discretion afforded to the city reduced the likelihood that the capi-
tal markets creditors would be able to block a plan that treated them unfa-
vorably when compared to retirees. Substantive fairness runs the risk of
being cabined by facts on the ground as well as the momentum of the case.
II. MUNICIPAL FINANCE
A. RISK DESCRIBED
In 2012 the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
issued a substantial report addressing several areas of concern with the mu-
nicipal securities market.74 The SEC Report made a number of background
statements about the parlous state of municipal finance in America. First
was its observation about the amount of municipal debt: the nominal amount
of municipal securities outstanding at the end of the first quarter of 2013 was
$3.73 trillion,7s an amount that has increased (albeit at a slower rate) even
since the onset of the financial crisis in 2008.76 Second were its observations
about the nature of "credit enhancement." The SEC Report found that prior
to 2007 "more than half of all new issues of municipal securities were credit-
enhanced."77 Since 2008, however, private credit enhancement in the form of
bank-issued letters of credit and traditional bond insurance has fallen substan-
tially.78 Instead of private insurance, credit enhancement currently takes the
form of guaranties by other governmental entities of the debt of a lower-level
or affiliated issuer.79 It remains to be seen whether higher-level political deci-
sion makers will better address the misdirected incentives of their municipal
counterparts.80
The next concern was with the opaque nature of the secondary market in
74SEC REPORT, supra note 30. The SEC REPORT explains that municipal securities are issued by
state and local governmental entities "to finance a variety of public projects, to meet cash flow and other
governmental needs, and to finance non-governmental private projects . . . ." Id. at 5.
"See Outstanding U.S. Bond Market Debt, SECURITIES INDUSTRY AND FINANCIAL MARKETS Asso-
CIATION ("SIFMA"), available at http://sifma.org/research/statistics.aspx (accessed June 19, 2013).
76SEC REPORT, supra note 30, at 6.
"Id. at 49.
7 5Id. For a history of municipal bond insurance from its beginnings in 1971 and its growth through the
early 2000s see Jonathan B. Justice & Steward Simon, Municipal Bond Insurance: Trends and Prospects, 22
PUB. BUDGETING & FIN. 114 (2002). For an account of the crisis in bond insurance in 2007-2008, see
FINAL REPORT OF NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOmIC CRISIS
IN THE UNITED STATES 276-77 (2011).
7 9See supra text accompanying note 31. Of course, unless carefully calibrated, guaranties by other
units of government may induce unwise risk taking by municipalities. See Clayton Gillette, Fiscal Federal-
ism, Political Will, and Strategic Use of Municipal Banikruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 286 (2012).
"oSee infra text accompanying notes 96-97.
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municipal securities.81 According to the SEC Report, "information about the
prices at which market participants may be willing to buy or sell a municipal
security, and who might be interested, is not broadly available ... 82 Thus,
while the secondary market in municipal securities is active, matching small
transactions is not straightforward and current pricing information is often
lacking. The prevalence of many relatively small retail investors attracted by
tax subsidies for municipal securities exacerbates this problem.8 3
Finally, with respect to default, the SEC Report observed that municipal-
ities have invoked legal insolvency regimes-state receiverships and chapter
9-only infrequently. 84 The near-perfect record of payment of municipal se-
curities has provided the historical cocoon that encouraged investors to be
lackadaisical about the fiscal and financial fundamentals of municipal debt is-
suers. And it is the issuers' historic fear of default-and its ramifications-
that Stockton threatened to overturn. Instead of the issuers, it could have
been the turn of bondholders to be saddled with more of the risk of default.
Payment of municipal securities comes from a variety of sources including
the general revenues of the municipality (the so-called "full faith and credit"
of the issuer based upon its full taxing powers), receipts from only specified
taxes, revenue generated from public projects, and payments from private en-
tities (who benefit from lower rates of interest on municipal securities
through so-called conduit revenue financing).85 More obscure forms of mu-
nicipal securities include moral obligation bonds and double-barreled bonds.86
Payment of municipal securities may be unsecured or secured by municipal
"See SEC REPORT, supra note 30, at 105 ("[M]arket participants have stated that access to current
financial information about issuers or obligated persons may be limited, difficult to find, or unavailable.").
82Id. at 115.
"See Adam J. Levitin, Bankrupt Politics and the Politics of Bankruptcy, 97 CORNELL L. REv. 1399,
1440 (2012) ("The presence of so many retail investors raises questions of market efficiency, as retail
investors often lack the access to information and the analytical capacity of institutional investors.").
14SEC REPORT, supra note 30, at 24 ("Since 1980 there have been, on average, only about 7.5 munici-
pal bankruptcy filings per year . . .
51d. at 1.
56See Certain Types of Municipal Securities, MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD., available at http://
www.msrb.org/Municipal-Bond-Market/About-Municipal-Securities/Types-of-Municipal-Securities.aspx
(accessed June 25, 2013). A moral obligation bond is:
usually issued by a state or agency, that is secured by a non-binding covenant that
any amount necessary to make up any deficiency in pledged revenues available for
debt service will be included in the budget recommendation made to the state legis-
lature or other legislative body, which may appropriate moneys to make up the
shortfall. The legislature or other legislative body, however, is not legally obligated
to make such an appropriation.
Id. A double-barreled bond is one that is "secured by a defined revenue source as well as the full faith and
credit of an issuer that has taxing power." Id.
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assets or the income from such assets.87 Revenue bond issues collateralized
by assets or payment streams are far more secure than general obligation
bonds.88 While the power to levy taxes appears to be a solid foundation on
which to base payment of general obligation bonds, forcing a recalcitrant mu-
nicipality to use that power may be challenging.89
Given its limited jurisdiction, the SEC's enforcement measures with re-
spect to municipal securities have been limited to occasional civil actions for
fraud.90 The antifraud provisions prohibit any person, including municipal
issuers, from making an untrue statement of material fact or omitting any
necessary material facts in relation to the offer, purchase, or sale of any secur-
ity.91 Thus, the SEC brought an action against San Diego in 2006 for making
false and misleading statements in disclosure statements92 and then in 2010
against New Jersey for similar reasons.93 The SEC did not seek criminal
prosecution or sanctions beyond injunctive-style relief in these cases, or any
other municipal cases.94
B. RISK HIDDEN
Public-sector retirement obligations have increased at a greater rate than
87See infra text accompanying note 138 (discussing unavoidability of liens securing special revenue
bonds).
"See infra text accompanying notes 134-36 (discussing exemption from automatic stay of § 362(a) of
the Bankruptcy Code).
"See Clayton P. Gillette, Bankruptcy and Its By-Products: A Comment on Skeel, 50 Hous. L. REV.
1129, 1132 (2013) (observing that states may employ defense of sovereign immunity); U.S. CONsT. amend.
XI (barring creditors from suing states in federal court for damages under state contract law). See also
Emily D. Johnson & Ernest A. Young, The Constitutional Law of State Debt, 7 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB.
POL'Y 117, 125 (2012).
9
"With exception of antifraud provisions, both the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77a, and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78a, contained broad exemptions for municipal securities.
SEC Staff Report on the Municipal Securities Market, [1993-2001 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P
(CCH) 85,217 (Sept. 3, 1993). The Commission has brought enforcement actions against Orange
County, California, for failing to disclose risks of the County's investment pool and financial condition and
the City of Syracuse, New York, for falsely claiming a surplus for its general and debt service funds. SEC
REPORT, supra note 30, at 31, 59-60. Recently, the SEC charged the City of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania,
with securities fraud for misleading public statements. See Press Release, Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, SEC Charges City of Harrisburg for Fraudulent Public Statements (May 6, 2-13), available at
www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171514194#.UuWoAvdpaSM. In 2013, the
SEC charged State of Illinois for failing to inform investors about its underfunded pensions. See Press
Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Charges Illinois for Misleading Pension Disclosures
(March 11, 2013), available at www.sec.gov/News/PressReleasse/Detail/PressRelease/
1365171513202#.UuWondpaSM.
9SEC REPORT, supra note 30, at 29.
92In re City of San Diego, Cal., (Nov. 14, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin//
33-8751.pdf.
93In re State of New Jersey, (Aug. 18, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin//33-
9135.pdf.
941d.; In re City of San Diego, Cal., (Nov. 14, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/
/33-8751.pdf.
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either public employee salaries or retirement benefits for private industry em-
ployees.9 s Several factors have precipitated this phenomenon. First, in good
economic times there is an incentive to increase public employee compensa-
tion generally. Across-the-board expansionary programs curry favor with an
electorate that generally fails to perceive their long-term cost. Even in good
times, however, there is political pressure not to increase public sector wages,
which are open to public scrutiny. This concern translates into increasing
benefits the long-term cost of which is opaque. Increasing wages and salaries
is far more obvious to the electorate than increasing benefits, a fact that is
aggravated by the political-agency phenomenon.96 In good times or bad, as-
piring politicians in low-turnout municipal elections seek the substantial po-
litical power of public employees and their unions.97 Especially in bad
economic times, the weakness of electoral discipline for municipal government
offices exacerbates the costs of political agency, leading to underfunding of
retirement benefits. In addition, automatic cost-of-living adjustments with-
out corresponding increases in contributions also lead to underfunding.98 In-
creasing benefits without corresponding increases in contributions for
whatever reason cannot be sustained in the long run.
The decline in the market value of assets following the financial crisis of
2008 has also contributed to underfunding public pensions. There is a strong
correlation between the S&P 500 and the market value of public pension
assets because pensions invest in a broad range of equities. Additionally, a
plan can appear to be fully funded in a bull market. Thus, when funding
ratios are high-creating the appearance that a plan is overfunded-there
9
'See Thomas J. Healey, et al., Underfunded Public Pensions in the United States: The Size of the
Problem, the Obstacles to Reform and the PathForward, M-RCBG FACULTY WORKING PAPER No. 2012.
08 25 (May 5, 2012) ("Underfunded Public Pensions"), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu//
ezp.site/storage/fckeditor/file/pdfs/centers-programs/centers/mrcbg/publications/fwp/MRCBGFWP
2012_08-HealeyUnderfunded.pdf:
While average state/local employee compensation tapered off a bit between 2009
and 2010 (and private sector compensation grew slightly), for more than a decade
state/local employees benefited from more substantial increases in their compensa-
tion and saw less of a decline after the financial crisis and economic downturn of
2007 and 2008.
The widespread conversion of private employee retirement benefits from defined benefit to defined contri-
bution plans has not tracked to the public sector.
96See David A. Skeel, Jr. States of Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHi. L. REv. 677, 690 (2012) ("Nearly every
state fiscal crisis can be traced, at least in part, to the agency costs of political decision makers-that is,
conflicts of interest between the incentives of the decision makers and the constituencies that they ostensi-
bly represent."); Levitin, supra note 83, at 1425-28 (discussing "political moral hazard").
9 7Skeel, supra note 96, at 690-93 (describing the distortions of the incentives of political decision
makers who depend on the votes of public union employees).
9
"See Healey, supra note 95, at 27-28. See also Johnson & Young, supra note 89, at 131 ("[A]t least
three states . . . have sought to restrict cost-of-living adjustments (COLA) to benefits for current
retirees.").
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will be political pressure to increase pension payouts. In a bear market, how-
ever, public pension plans cannot reduce promised benefits and are left with a
reduced ratio of assets to obligations and an underfunded position.99
Thirdly, the changing demographics of the United States exacerbate the
underfunding of pensions. The American population is aging' 00 and there are
proportionately fewer taxpaying workers to support public pensions and the
retirees who depend on them. As the burden of funding public pensions is
shifted to a smaller population of workers, the costs of pensions will become
unsustainable.ol Stockton's substantial retiree obligations are not unique
among American state and municipal governments. Various sources have
concluded that unfunded liabilities for such plans in the United States range
from a high of $4 trillion,102 down to $1.38 trillion,10 3 to a low of $1.1 tril-
lion.104 Cumulative plan deficits are substantial regardless of the actuarial
assumptions made,105 and the percentage of funding of state pensions range
from only four states at 95% or above to four states below a very low 55% of
full funding.1o 6 According to the recent report by The Pew Center on the
States, "a healthy pension system should be at least 80 percent funded" and
thirty-four states were below that amount at the end of 2010.107 A more
recent study by Moody's Investor Service paints an even bleaker picture.108
Beyond the simmering crisis in public pensions, state funding of retiree health
99Healey, supra note 95, at 26-27.
"Id. at 30 (In 1980, 69% of Americans were under the age of 45; by 2009 that ratio had dropped to
61%. The U.S. Census Bureau projects that by 2050 this ratio will drop to a rate of 57.4%.").
'Id. ("The U.S. Social Security system serves as useful proxy for an analysis of the overall American
support ratio. Social Security has seen its worker-to-recipient ratio decline from 16.5 to 1 in 1950 to a
current ratio of 2.9 to 1"). See also Jonathan V. Last, WHAT TO EXPECT WHEN No ONE's EXPECTING:
AMERICA'S COMING DEMOGRAPHic DISASTER 27 (2013) ("Fewer working-age people supporting more
retirees means that something will have to give: Either benefits will be scaled back, non-entitlement spend-
ing cut, or taxes raised.").
'o2State and Local Government Defined Benefit Pension Plans, U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE
(January 2012), available at http://www.hatch.senate.gov/public/-cache/files/ecfaf678-a3ec-45a4-3bca4
fe9475d/Hatch%20Report%20-%2OThe%2OPension%2ODebt%2OCrisis%20that%2oThreatens%20
America.pdf.
03THE PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, THE WIDENING GAP UPDATE 1 (2012) (the "PEW REPORT"),
available at http://www.pewstates.org/research/reports/the-widening-gap-update-85899398241.
1
o
4Alicia H. Munnell, et al., The Funding of State and Local Pensions: 2011-2015 (May 2012), availa-
ble at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/slp-24.pdf. (The shortfall of $1.1 trillion is based
on the present assumption of an 8% discount rate. Lower projected rates of return lead to projection of
greater unfunded deficits.)
o'Resolution of what should be the appropriate discount rate will not be attempted here. For a
discussion of the competing concerns see SEC REPORT, supra note 30, at 86-88.
06See PEW REPORT, supra note 103, at 2.
071d.
'
0
oSee Adjusted Pension Liability Medians for US States: New Measures Highlight Varying Af-
fordability, MOODY'S INVESTORSSERV. (June 27, 2013), available at https://www.moodys.com/research/
Moodys-New-state-adjusted-pension-liabilities-show-widerange-of-PR_276663. See also Susan E.
Cancelosi, Vebas to the Rescue: Evaluating One Alternative for Public Sector Retiree Health Benefits, 42 J.
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benefits is even weaker.109 Under any view of the situation the retirement
plans of many states and municipalities are insolvent and the extent of that
insolvency is substantial.1 0
Notwithstanding widespread public pension underfunding, extensions of
municipal finance continue unabated"' and at relatively low rates of inter-
est.112 The fact that states cannot seek bankruptcy relief may contribute to
the market's nonchalance. The policy of the United States Federal Reserve
Board known as "quantitative easing"1 13 has done much to keep all interest
rates low by historical standards.1i4 Finally, the redistributive effects of fed-
eral government spending stabilize municipal economies and thus reduce the
risk of default.115 Direct grants to state and local governments as well as
payments to the elderly, those on public assistance, and the disabled-what
Adam Levitin describes as fiscal federalism-provide municipal residents
with the wherewithal to pay taxes and thus tide cities as well as themselves
through economic crises.' 16  Even with these subsidies for municipal finance,
Marshall L. Rev. 879, 880-81 (2009) ("Most [government employers] have financed retiree health benefits
on a pay-as-you-go basis, with no assets set aside for future expenses.").
" See PEw REPORT, supra note 103, at 6. See also SEC REPORT, supra note 30, at 88 ("A recent
study found that as of fiscal year 2010, only 5% of the $660 billion liability for state retirees' health care
and other non-pension benefits had been funded.").
i"oSee Skeel, supra note 26, at 1076 ("In the current environment, many states' balance sheets dramati-
cally understate the extent of their liabilities."); Healey, supra note 95, at 31 ("[T]he assets and liabilities
of public pension plans have historically been kept off the statements of net assets (or balance sheets) of
public pension plan sponsors.").
iiiMunicipal bond issues totaled $151.1 billion in 2012 and $83.3 billion through only the first quarter
of 2013. See US Bond Market Issuance spreadsheet, supra note 75.
112See Christine Sgarlata Chung, Municipal Securities: The Crisis of State and Local Government
Indebtedness, Systemic Costs of Low Default Rates, and Opportunities for Reforn, 34 CARDOZo L. REV.
1455, 1460 (2013) ('Despite these developments [e.g., growth in volume and complexity of municipal
securities, increased dispersal of investors, and rate volatility], the conventional wisdom respecting risk
and municipal securities has not changed much over the years."). But see Skeel, supra note 26, at 1069
('State and municipal bond markets ... appear to distinguish fairly effectively between troubled and less
troubled states."); Mary Williams Walsh, Cost of Public Projects Is Rising, and Pain Will Be Felt for Years,
NEW YORK TIMEs DEALBOOK (June 26, 2013), available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/06/26/
bill-for-public-projects-is-rising-and-pain-will-be-felt-for-years/?_php=true&-type=blogs& r=0 (last ac-
cessed June 27, 2013) ("States and cities across the nation are starting to learn what Wall Street already
knows: the days of easy money are coming to an end.").
iilET Bureau, ET in the Classroom: Quantitative Easing II, THE ECONOMic TIMEs (Nov. 2, 2010),
available at http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2010-11-02/news/27632554_ILcapital-flows-
capital-inflows-economy.
"i4 See Morgan Ricks, A Regulatory Design for Monetary Stability, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1289, 1315
(2012) (discussing Federal Reserve's effecting of monetary expansion through quantitative easing in 2011
that led to "risk-free rates [that were] remarkably low by historical standards").
iiSSee Richard C. Schragger, Citizens Versus Bondholders, 39 FORD. URB. L. 787, 798 (2012) ("Local
governments receive direct aid from the federal government. More important is the aid that flows to
individuals through federal social welfare programs. The rise of the social welfare state means that eco-
nomic downturns do not necessarily lead to economic collapse.").
"'See generally Levitin, supra note 83, at 1406-19.
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the secondary market in municipal securities demonstrates that all municipal
debt is not created equal and that the market is waking to previously ignored
risks.' 17 One might expect the risk premium to increase for cities in states
where bondholders receive less than retirees in bankruptcy, but this so far
has not happened.
Regardless of the depth of the market for public finance, the effect of a
non-pro rata treatment of municipal pension obligations remains unclear. Can
a plan that is inconsistent with either bankruptcy or state-law fairness be
crammed down over the objection of an impaired class? Are there reasons
why such an impaired class might nonetheless vote for a plan that provides
such treatment?
C. RISK REMAINS
A single feature ties together what appear to be three irreconcilable phe-
nomena: (1) incomplete disclosure of municipal finance risk yet rare SEC en-
forcement actions; (2) continued issuance of municipal securities but with
low rates of interest; and (3) continuing purchases of municipal securities
notwithstanding weaker forms of credit enhancement and looming municipal
insolvency. What keeps this dysfunctional market going is low rates of de-
fault.118 As long as investors are ultimately paid, no one is greatly concerned
about the many defects in the market for municipal securities. No harm, no
foul, so to speak.
1. Where Risk Resides
Christine Sgarlata Chung has described the dark side of this seemingly
idyllic state of affairs."19 There is a cost to this bondholder protection; ulti-
mately someone must pay. And it is taxpayers and recipients of municipal
services who bear the primary risk of financial distress when bondholders are
largely impervious to default. When compared with corporate borrowers
and their shareholders, the borrowing decisions and sources of repayment of
municipalities are less flexible and the exit rights of their taxpaying residents
are much more expensive. Many of the reasons for continuing municipal bor-
rowing are structural; cities do not have the power to decide not to supply
"
7 See, e.g., Investors in Detroit Municipal Bonds Are Nervous, DETROIT FREE PRESS (December 18,
2011), available at http://www.municipalinsider.com/investors-in-detroit-municipalbonds-are-nervous/
('Detroit's general obligation bonds have recently traded at the deepest discount-some around 67 cents
on the dollar.")
"'See James Spiotto, et al., MUNICIPALITIES IN DISTREss? How STATES AND INVESTORS DEAL WITH
LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL EMERGENCIES 10 (2012):
Since 1839, there have been less than 11,000 municipal (local government) defaults.
Almost half of these occurred between 1929-1937 in the Great Depression. The
number of defaults is quite small given that presently there are over 89,000 local
governments (municipal and state entities) in the United States of America.
"9See Chung, supra note 112.
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basic services such as fire and police protection, water and sewer services, or
public education.120 The countercyclical nature of demands on municipal ser-
vices also challenges municipal solvency. When economic conditions are at
their worst, more of a city's residents seek its services for assistance with
shelter and security.121 Municipalities also have inelastic sources of ordinary
revenue-real estate taxes and user fees-and very restricted powers to sell
assets.122 Most limiting of all is the high cost to taxpayers of escaping in-
creasing tax burdens imposed to pay municipal securities;123 they must sell
their real property, an expensive proposition whether it is a home or business
location.12 4 The upside to municipalities of negligible risk to bond purchasers
is lower interest rates; the downside is a heavy burden on an issuer's taxpay-
ers and other stakeholders, who can neither diversify against risk nor insulate
themselves from it.125 The combination of legal and political regimes that
substantially eliminate the ability of a municipality to default have effectively
shifted the risk of financial distress from bondholders to others including em-
ployees, retirees, service recipients, and taxpayers. Yet, it was the question of
continuation of bondholder protection that Stockton's bankruptcy raised. If
Stockton's plan leaves retirees unimpaired then bondholders or taxpayers
stand to lose. Bankruptcy is a zero sum game. The question is where the risk
of insolvency ultimately comes to rest.
'
20 See Schragger, supra note 115, at 795 ("[L]ocal governments are compelled by state mandates to
provide certain services. Unlike firms, cities cannot restructure those basic obligation."); Chung, supra
note 112, at 1481-82 ("Because the size, scope and timing of governmental projects may be dictated by
community needs or legal requirement, municipal securities issuers may not have much flexibility respect-
ing the purpose, timing or size of securities offerings.").
12 1See Levitin, supra note 83, at 1407-08 (discussing countercyclical demands on state services that
apply equally to cities).
122Chung, supra note 112, at 1482 ('Unlike corporations, municipal securities issuers cannot enter or
exit businesses to generate revenues, nor can they easily leverage or sell assets to raise funds for debt
service obligations.").
12 3Alternatively, a municipality may choose not to increase taxes but instead reduce services. Econom-
ically, the impact on taxpayers is the same. See Candy Neal, Officials Worry Bills Could Drop Revenue,
THE HERALD, January 30, 2013, at 3, available at duboiscountyherald.com/b/officials-worry-bills-could-
drop-revenue.
'
24Chung, supra note 112, at 1483-84:
Once a taxpayer 'buys in' to the municipal enterprise through the purchase of resi-
dential real estate . . . her choices are limited. She must pay governmental levies
whether or not she agrees with a particular expenditure. . . . If the taxpayer is not
happy with this state of affairs, she may be left with having to sell her real estate
and move out of town. This is likely to involve significant transaction costs, espe-
cially when real estate markets are in turmoil.
'"Jim Christie, Stockton Taxpayers Want Bigger Role in California City's Bankruptcy Case, Reuters
(Jun. 28, 2013), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/29/us-stockton-bankruptcy-taxpay
ers-. Some taxpayers of Stockton belatedly reached this conclusion and an ad hoc working group of tax-
payers appeared in the case. See Notice of Appearance and Request for Special Notice Pursuant to
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2002 at 1, In re City of Stockton, No. 12-32118 (June 28, 2013),
ECF No. 970.
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Modern portfolio theory explains that risk can be reduced by improving
the quality, liquidity, and diversification of assets. 126 Pension payments may
be the only source of income for retirees and, given their higher ages, they
have fewer alternative sources of income than, say, current municipal employ-
ees. Taxpayers as well as other recipients of municipal services can address
the negative effects of risk by moving from a municipality when the cost or
level of services changes for the worse. Employees can, of course, change jobs.
But it is more difficult for retirees, taxpayers, or employees to reduce risk give
than it is for bondholders given the need of the former to live in a particular
place and the costs of getting or changing jobs. Such individuals find it diffi-
cult to diversify.
It is bondholders as a class who have the greatest opportunity to reduce
the risk of nonpayment by an issuer. Prudent bondholders will examine the
financial quality of the issuerl 27 and diversify their investments across a wide
portfolio. Bond underwriters can spread the cost of evaluating the soundness
of an issuer more efficiently than individual investors. Similarly, underwriters
can require credit insurance, which is not available to individuals. Yet, only
three sorts of municipal stakeholders-retirees, employees, and bondhold-
ers-clearly have standing in bankruptcy; taxpayers and service recipients do
not. Members of municipal government could protect these stakeholders, but
agency costs and the general lack of electoral discipline make this uncertain.
Chung argues that given the current state of affairs in which financial risk
is largely allocated to taxpayers, the federal regulatory scheme for municipal
securities should be enhanced to address their risks: "[A] system of regulation
which systemically externalizes known risks and costs experienced by liter-
ally millions of taxpayer stakeholders reflects questionable regulatory pol-
icy."128 She instead would have federal securities laws modified to bring
taxpayers into the equation, principally by applying a fiduciary standard to
underwriters and the relevant government officials involved in issuing munic-
ipal securities. 29 These duties would run not only to investors but also to
taxpayers.130 Together with other regulatory reforms, Chung believes that
126See Hilary J. Allen, Monday Market Fund Reform Viewed Through a Systemic Risk Lens, 11 J. Bus.
& SEc. L. 87, 96 (2010).
2 7But see supra text accompanying notes 81-83 (describing opacity of secondary municipal bond
market).
12sChung, supra note 112, at 1519.
"
9See generally id. at 1520-24.
o
301d. at 1520-21:
I would require these stakeholders [e.g., underwriters and government officials] to
1) comply with fiduciary duties of care and loyalty when providing advice, consid-
ering the benefits, risks and cost of funding plans over both the short and long term,
and 2) place the short and long term interests of issuers before those of the stake-
holder owing the fiduciary obligation.
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the risk of municipal insolvency will be better identified and more openly (if
not more fairly) allocated.'31 But the fact remains that the current state of
affairs obtains in contemporary municipal bankruptcies. The question is
whether a plan of adjustment that turns none, some, or all of that risk back to
investors and away from taxpayers, employees, and retirees meet the stan-
dard of bankruptcy fairness and thus may be crammed down.
2. Political Reallocation
Procedural fairness can be considered as entailing transparent allocation
of risk.' 3 2 As Clayton Gillette argues, however, the issue of procedural fair-
ness cannot be entirely subsumed in the bankruptcy process.' 33 An initial
allocation of risk and its subsequent reallocation in bankruptcy, even if that
reallocation comports with substantive fairness, may not be procedurally fair.
Substantive fairness-as used in this article-does not address the initial al-
location of risk. An unfair allocation of risk-initial unfairness-may precede
a municipality's chapter 9, thus rendering the bankruptcy process, no matter
how procedurally fair, the means by which initial unfairness is granted judi-
cial imprimatur. The city of Central Falls, Rhode Island, is Gillette's prime
example of initial unfairness distorting the application of chapter 9.
Compared with the treatment of secured creditors under other chapters
of the Bankruptcy Code, secured bondholders receive special solicitude under
chapter 9. Section 922(d)134 exempts from the automatic stay payment of
"special revenues" 35 contractually pledged to bondholders by a municipal-
ity.'3 6 Elsewhere the Bankruptcy Code provides that prepetition payments
to bondholders cannot be avoided as preferences.' 37 Similarly, state law stat-
utory liens running in favor of bondholders are generally unavoidable.'1 8 Nor
can the claim of a revenue bondholder be bifurcated between unsecured and
secured portions as would be the case in any bankruptcy outside of chapter
9.139 Collateralized municipal securities are well protected by bankruptcy
1 Id. at 1524 ("[A] fiduciary standard has the potential to improve the quality of deliberations associ-
ated with municipal funding plans, to ensure loyal conduct from stakeholders ... and to (at least) reduce
the frequency and severity of harms associated with a lack of due care and/or loyalty breaches.").
13'2See Bruce Chapman, Allocating the Risk of Subjectivity: Intention, Consent, and Insurance, 57 To-
RONTo L. REv. 315, 329 (2007).
'"
5 Gillette, supra note 89.
i341 1 U.S.C. § 922(d) ("Notwithstanding section 362 of this title and subsection (a) of this section, a
petition filed under this chapter does not operate as a stay of application of pledged special revenues in a
manner consistent with section 927 of this title to payment of indebtedness secured by such revenues.").
isSSee supra text accompanying notes 85-86.
"'For the history of this provision see Spiotto, supra note 118, at 54-56.
1371 1 U.S.C. § 926(b) ("A transfer of property of the debtor to or for the benefit of any holder of a
bond or note, on account of such bond or note, may not be avoided under section 547 of this title.").
1311 U.S.C. § 545.
"13l U.S.C. § 928(a) ("Notwithstanding section 552(a) of this title and subject to subsection (b) of
this section, special revenues acquired by the debtor after the commencement of the case shall remain
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law.
The risk to retirees, employees, and unsecured creditors of nonpayment
or to taxpayers is increased because of the heightened protection for secured
bondholders. The protections for revenue bonds exist regardless of whether
it was wise to issue the bonds in the first place. Taxpayers, employees, and
retirees could have examined bond issues to see if they were collateralized or
otherwise secured by statutory liens but the costs to individuals greatly ex-
ceeds any reasonably expected personal benefit. Thus, the combination of
state legislation and bankruptcy law shifts virtually all risks from revenue
bondholders to other stakeholders. Initial allocations of risk set the table for
application of the standard of bankruptcy fairness.
What if-after bonds have been issued and sold as unsecured general
bonds-a state purposely combines the bankruptcy protection afforded statu-
tory liens with the particular unavoidability of liens against municipalities?
And what if it does so shortly before one of its cities files under chapter 9?
Rhode Island carried out such an ex post reallocation of "initial" risk from
previously unsecured bondholders to employees, retirees, and taxpayers.140
Immediately prior to the Central Falls bankruptcy, Rhode Island simply con-
verted unsecured general obligation bonds to secured revenue ones through
legislative fiat.141 The result was, as Gillette observes, "to grant the bond-
holders within the state priority over other claimants. . . such as city employ-
ees or pensioners . . . ."142 This effect of this eve-of-bankruptcy unavoidable
transfer was stark: previously unsecured general obligation bondholders re-
ceived 100% of their claims while pension claims received 55% of theirs and
municipal services to taxpayers were reduced.14 3 This application of the
Bankruptcy Code to Central Falls was straightforward; it met the standards
of both bankruptcy and state-law fairness. Initial fairness and substantive
fairness are inextricably intertwined and after-the-fact reallocations of initial
risk strike most people as inherently unfair.144 Yet, such non-bankruptcy
reallocations are clearly protected by the Tenth Amendment.
subject to any lien resulting from any security agreement entered into by the debtor before the commence-
ment of the case.").
14oSee R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-12-1(a) (2011) ("The faith and credit, ad valorem taxes, and general fund
revenues of each city, town and district shall be pledged for the payment of the principal of, premium and
the interest on, all general obligation bonds and notes of the city or town whether or not the pledge is
stated in the bonds or notes, or in the proceedings authorizing their issue and shall constitute a first lien on
such ad valorem taxes and general fund revenues.").
4 iRhode Island is not the only state to secure general obligation bonds with a statutory lien. See
generally Spiotto, supra note 118, at 57-60.
4'4 Gillette, supra note 89, at 1143-44.41Id. at 1144.
144 For an alternative (or supplemental) analysis of the political and social dynamics that lead state and
municipal governments to treat holders of municipal securities with greater solicitude than citizens and
certain other creditors, see Schragger, supra note 115, at 799-803 (describing concerns about subsequent
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Nothing like the last-minute statutory transformation of general obliga-
tion bonds into revenue bonds has taken place in California. As noted above,
California law provides CalPERS with a statutory lien to secure a municipal-
ity's pension termination liability.145 There is no lien if a municipality does
not terminate its pension management agreement with CalPERS, and even
that lien secures only underfunded pension obligations. To the extent pen-
sion obligations are impaired inside bankruptcy, there is no lien. It is even
conceivable that a municipality could find itself overfunded vis-a'-vis
CalPERS if pension obligations are sufficiently reduced, in which case it
would be due a refund.146 The question is thus whether vested municipal
pension obligations can be reduced in bankruptcy. Can impairment of pen-
sion claims meet the requirement of state-law fairness? Would conforming to
state-law fairness violate bankruptcy fairness?
In the chapter 9 bankruptcy of the City of Vallejo, CalPERS took the
position that vested pension benefits were immune from modification even in
chapter 9, and that a municipality's contract with it could not be rejected.147
In other words, and not surprisingly, CalPERS argued that state-law fairness
trumped bankruptcy fairness. While the court in Vallejo never ruled on
CalPERS's second assertion, it held that federal bankruptcy law preempted
inconsistent California law with respect to rejection of collective bargaining
agreements that had created the pensions Vallejo proposed to reduce.148 In
other words, bankruptcy fairness trumped state-law fairness. The court's
reasoning was straightforward: federal bankruptcy law preempts California
labor law to the contrary.149 Cities have the power to reject executory con-
tracts notwithstanding state efforts to impose its law on the bankruptcy
process.150
CalPERS, like other stakeholders, can expect to be exposed to the risk of
nonpayment. Coupled with the Stockton court's conclusion in Stockton II
that the obligation to pay retirees' pensions is not an executory contract,' 5 it
seems unlikely that CalPERS would succeed in asserting a termination lien
on account of impairment of retiree claims. Yet, one can also question
lack of access to credit markets, financial contagion, hostility toward public employee unions and redis-
tributional spending).
145See supra text accompanying note 18.
'
46 See CAL. Gov. CODE § 20577.
i47 See Objection by California Public Employees' Retirement System to the City of Vallejo's Motion
for Approval of Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements at 9-12, In re City of Vallejo, No. 08-
26813, (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2008), ECF No. 312.
'
48See In re City of Vallejo, 403 B.R. 72, 77 (Bankr. E.D. Cal 2009), affd sub nom. Int'l Bhd. of Elec.
Workers v. City of Vallejo (In re City of Vallejo), 432 B.R. 262 (E.D. Cal. 2010).
i4'Id. at 77.
isold. at 76-77. See also Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. City of Vallejo (In re City of Vallejo), 432 B.R.
at 270.
isiStockton II, 478 BR. at 22.
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whether a plan could be crammed down if it did not impair the unfunded
portion of claims of retirees and also included assumption of Stockton's con-
tract with CalPERS. Could such a plan meet the test of bankruptcy fairness?
If the results in Central Falls are a model, a municipality may choose to take
up or forgo use of bankruptcy to implement whichever aspect of substantive
unfairness it chooses. A municipality that privileges bankruptcy fairness over
state-law fairness or one that proposes the opposite appears equally likely to
be able to confirm a plan. Whether such should be the case is a different
matter. 152
III. ASSUMPTION AS A GAME CHANGER
The power to assume (or reject) executory contracts under section 365 of
the Bankruptcy Code is crucial to maximizing value for creditors.15 Main-
taining contracts by which the debtor acquires necessary goods or services is
vital to its continued operation. Assumption permits a debtor and the con-
tract counterparty to continue their relationship notwithstanding the bank-
ruptcy. Conversely, in some circumstances continuing to perform a contract
may be burdensome to a debtor; rejection brings the contract to an end and in
return gives the counterparty a claim for damages.154
Exercising the power to assume or to reject in a municipal bankruptcy
raises several questions. First, since Congress failed to define "executory con-
tract," the court must resolve whether a municipality's agreements with its
retirees are executory contracts. The court in Stockton II concluded that
they were not. As the bankruptcy court observed in Stockton IV, municipal-
ities may pay claimants apart from assumption of an executory contract but
such payment may create subsequent confirmation-related issues. But what
of executory contract counterparties? Does assumption effectively foreclose
consideration of substantive fairness? Second, if retiree benefits are part of an
executory contract, the court must choose and apply a standard to any mo-
tion to assume them. How much deference should the court pay to the city's
judgment when assumption of certain contracts may substantially constrain
the terms of a plan? Once a contract has been assumed, it is treated as an
administrative expense and afforded priority treatment, thus limiting subse-
quent choices. 1 "s Assumption would greatly limit options in any plan and
would raise the "creeping confirmation" issue noted by the court in Stockton
IV. Could preconfirmation assumption be substantively unfair?
"
2 See infra text accompanying notes 236-243.
'"See N.L.R.B. v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 531 (1984); Philadelphia Co. v. Dipple, 312 U.S.
168, 173-74 (1941).
"
4 See generally 3 ALAN N. RESNICK & HENRY J. SOMMER, EDS., COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
365.10 (16th ed. 2013) (describing effects of assumption and rejection).
5s11 U.S.C. §§ 365(g)(2)(A), 503(b), 507(a)(2), 943(b)(5).
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A. THE DEFINING QUESTION
The failure of the Bankruptcy Code to define "executory contract" has
generated multiple judicial decisions and reams of academic commentary.
Most courts have adopted the Countryman definition that an executory con-
tract exists only where both the debtor and its counterparty have remaining
unperformed material duties.156 Others have been less concerned with the
need for formal reciprocity of the potential for material breach than with the
advantage assumption might bring the debtor's estate and creditors, the so-
called functional test.15 7 Stockton is in the Ninth Circuit but the Ninth
Circuit's understanding of "executory contract" is unclear. In the early Tex-
scan decision, it expressly adopted the Countryman definition and the re-
quirement that both contract parties be capable of materially breaching for a
contract to count as executory.158 More recently, however, the Ninth Cir-
cuit observed that "[a] contract is executory, and therefore assumable under
§ 365, only if one party's failure to perform its obligation would excuse the
other party's performance." 15 Mutuality of executory obligations was not
required; the functional test prevailed.
Retiree pension benefits that are part of a collective bargaining agree-
ments would be part of an executory contract from a functional perspective
subject to proving their assumption would benefit the municipality. They
would not be part of an executory contract under the Countryman test, how-
ever, because retirees owe no further duties to their former employer; they
cannot breach. Affected retirees would have only a claim under the Country-
man definition.160 Even then, their claims should be bifurcated between
what has been funded by a city's contributions to an administrator like
CalPERS with an unsecured remainder161 and only the unsecured portion
can be impaired.
B. A MATTER OF JUDGMENT
In contrast with settlement of claims, assumption of an executory con-
"
6 Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 460 (1973).
See RCI Tech. Corp. v. Sunterra Corp. (In re Sunterra Corp.), 361 F.3d 257, 264 (4th Cir. 2004) (applying
Countryman test).
'1sSee, e.g., Jay L. Westbrook, A Functional Analysis of Executory Contracts, 74 MINN. L. REV. 227
(1989); Chattanooga Mem'l Park v. Still (In re Jolly), 574 F.2d 349, 350-51 (6th Cit. 1978).
"Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Texscan Corp. (In re Texscan Corp.), 976 F.2d 1269, 1272 (9th Cir.
1992).
'
5 9Zurich Amer. Ins. Co. v. Int'l Fibercom, Inc. (In re International Fibercom, Inc.), 503 F.3d 933, 941
(9th Cir. 2007) (citing Texscan).
"Stockton II, 478 B.R. at 27 ("The plaintiffs' asserted right to require the City to continue to pay for
health benefits based on their prebankruptcy contractual rights are 'claims.'-).
i"See Skeel, supra note 96, at 698 ("It is quite likely that a court would conclude that pension benefi-
ciaries do have a property interest, but only to the extent of the funds the state [or municipality] has set
aside for payment. The unfunded portions would be treated as general unsecured obligations.-).
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tract remains subject to bankruptcy court approval in chapter 9. Section 901
of the Bankruptcy Code incorporates section 365, which governs assumption
and rejection of executory contracts. 162 Whatever standard of judicial re-
view applies to assumption of executory contracts outside chapter 9 equally
applies to municipal decisions to assume or reject.163 While the contours of
the standard of judicial review vary among the circuits, the Ninth Circuit in
Pomona Valley Medical Groupl64 provides perhaps the most deferential
guideline: a bankruptcy court "need engage in only a cursory review" of a
decision to reject an executory contract. 65 Indeed, the debtor is afforded
presumptions of acting prudently, with sufficient information, in good faith,
and with honesty.166 Only if a decision to reject is "so manifestly unreasona-
ble" that it must have been the result of 'bad faith, or whim or caprice" is the
court warranted in denying the debtor's motion.167  The breadth of the
Ninth Circuit's holding on rejection leaves no reason to believe that a less
deferential standard would be applied to a debtor's decision to assume, and
other courts have held that decisions to assume are subject to the same de-
gree of deference afforded a decision to reject.168 Nothing in the Ninth Cir-
cuit's understanding of section 365 would preclude Stockton from seeking to
assume its agreements with CalPERS and its bargaining units.
C. TIMING Is EVERYTHING
Given the powerful effect of assumption of significant executory con-
tracts on any subsequent plan, might the court simply defer decision until the
hearing on confirmation? Section 365(d)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code provides
that a debtor or trustee may seek assumption of an executory contract "at
any time before the confirmation of a plan."'69 Yet, the debtor need not take
action before confirmation because section 1123(b)(2) provides for assump-
tion as part of a plan of reorganization.o70 It would be a rare municipal bank-
16211 U.S.C. § 901(a).
16
'See Moran v. City of Cent. Falls, 475 BR. 323, 332 (D.R.I. 2012) (affirming decision of bankruptcy
court permitting municipal debtor to reject executory contract and observing that judicial review of deci-
sion to reject is "limited to a determination whether such decision was made with sound business
judgment.")
164Agarwal v. Pomona Valley Med. Grp., Inc. (In re Pomona Valley Medical Grp., Inc.), 476 F.3d 666
(9th Cir. 2007).
resId. at 670.
'
66Id.
1671d.
168See, e.g., In re Natco Indus., Inc., 54 B.R. 436, 440 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985); In re Old Carco LLC, 406
B.R. 180, 187-88 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009); In re Hawker Beechcraft, Inc., 486 B.R. 264, 275-77 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2013).
16911 U.S.C. § 365(d)(2) ('In a case under chapter 9 ... the trustee may assume or reject an executory
contract ... of the debtor at any time before the confirmation of a plan . . . .-).
17011 U.S.C. § 1123 (b) ("Subject to subsection (a) of this section, a plan may .. .(2) subject to section
365 of this title, provide for the assumption, rejection, or assignment of any executory contract or
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ruptcy where a long-standing pension administration contract or collective
bargaining agreement would need to be assumed before confirmation. Unlike
commercial lessors or licensors of intellectual property, plan administrators
and municipal employees are unlikely to have better deals in the offing.
The expression "creeping confirmation" mentioned in Stockton IV171
dates to 1983 and the Fifth Circuit's decision in the Braniff' 7 2 case. To-
gether with its subsequent decision in Continental,'7 1 the Fifth Circuit
deemed at least some attempts to engineer preconfirmation sales of substan-
tially all of a debtor's assets under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code to
amount to a sub rosa plan of reorganization without the protections afforded
dissenting creditors under section 1129. The scope of the transaction pro-
posed in Braniff was exceptional. Not only did the debtor seek approval of a
sale of nearly all of its assets, the purchase price was travel scrip, unsecured
notes, and a share of the profits in the purchasing airline.174 The underlying
purchase agreement went on to require that secured creditors vote their defi-
ciency claims as directed by the unsecured creditors' committee and for a
release of all claims against the officers and directors of the debtor.'" The
court had little difficulty concluding that an order approving the wide scope
of the agreement went beyond section 363 and amounted to a reorganization
without voting.176 Braniff did not, however, establish a standard of judicial
review for bankruptcy sales. It held only that such all-encompassing propos-
als were outside the scope of section 365.
In 1986 the Fifth Circuit also reversed approval of the sale transaction in
Continental; however, both the scope of the transaction and the nature of the
court's concerns were more limited in the later case. In the fewer than three
years between Braniff and Continental, the Second Circuit had stated in Lio-
nel'7 7 a deferential standard of judicial review for bankruptcy sales. On the
one hand, the Second Circuit concluded that the bankruptcy court did not
have unfettered discretion to approve sales. On the other hand, it also noted
that sales of substantially all of the debtor's assets need not proceed through
a confirmed plan.178 The appropriate standard of judicial review was simply
unexpired lease of the debtor not previously rejected under such section); see also 11 U.S.C. § 90 1(a)
(incorporating § 1123(b) into chapter 9).
171 In re City of Stockton, 486 B.R. 194 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013).
172Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Braniff Airways, Inc. (In re Braniff Airways, Inc.), 700 F.2d 935 (5th
Cir. 1983).
173Inst. Creditors of Cont'l Air Lines, Inc. v. Cont'l Air Lines, Inc. (In Te Cont'l Air Lines, Inc.), 780
F.2d 1223 (5th Cir. 1986).
174Braniff Airways, 700 F.2d at 939. The sale agreement also directed distribution of the scrip. Id.
17sId. at 939-40.
i76Id. at 940.
7 7Comm. of Equity Security Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063 (2nd Cir.
1983).
7sId. at 1069-71.
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"some articulated business justification, other than appeasement of major
creditors," 179 although the court's analysis suggested that factors like the pro-
portion of value of the assets to be sold to the whole, the lapse of time since
filing, and the timing of a plan, and "the effect of the proposed disposition on
future plans of reorganization" should be taken into account.o80 The Fifth
Circuit in Continental acknowledged the danger of a sub rosa or creeping
plan of reorganization and ultimately reversed the decision by the district
court approving a sale but only because the lower court had failed to address
the substantive objections of the parties opposing the deal.' 8 ' For debtors
that seek preemptive assumption, the Fifth Circuit suggested a bankruptcy
court may do something other than simply deny approval of a transaction
that overreaches section 363. A bankruptcy court instead can fashion "pro-
tective measures" along the lines of plan confirmation.182 Deferral of judicial
approval until confirmation would be a simple protective measure.
Since Braniff, courts have regularly acknowledged that "creeping confir-
mation" is to be avoided but have rarely found it a sufficient ground to reject
a proposed transaction supported by virtually any business reason.' 83 Per-
haps debtors have learned a lesson and are simply not seeking to use overly
broad assumption motions because of concerns about challenges to confirma-
tion. In any event, even the Fifth Circuit gave this concern short shrift when
it came to a debtor's motion to assume a lease as opposed to a sale of as-
sets.'8 4 Yet the Ninth Circuit has not addressed the issue, leaving it open for
litigation had Stockton sought prior to confirmation to assume unmodified
collective bargaining agreements and its contract with CalPERS.
On the one hand, the comparatively light review afforded a debtor's deci-
sion to assume an executory contract might tempt a municipality to assume
pension-related contracts if its government prefers the class of local employ-
ees and retirees over distant bondholders. On the other hand, lack of urgency
for assumption of such contracts-a city's employees are unlikely to leave so
long as their contracts have not been rejected-and the ease of deferring
consideration of a motion until the hearing on confirmation make it unlikely a
city will seek to jump the gun. After all, the good will of the court and
future purchasers of municipal securities will also weigh in the balance.
1791d. at 1070.
'sold. at 1071.
"'iContinental, 780 F.2d at 1228.
182Id.
'See Craig A. Sloane, The Sub Rosa Plan of Reorganization: Side-Stepping Creditor Protections in
Chapter 11, 16 BANKR. DEV. J. 37, 52-54 (1999).
's
4See Richmond Leasing Co. v. Capital Bank, N.A., 762 F.2d 1303, 1312 (5th Cir. 1985) ("We do not
doubt that a debtor can assume a lease under its original, prebankruptcy terms without creating a sub rosa
plan of reorganization, so long as such an assumption is a valid exercise of a debtor's business judgment.").
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IV. CONFIRMATION
Confirmation of a chapter 9 plan of adjustment is governed by the rele-
vant sections of Chapter 11.185 Not surprisingly, if the rights of a class of
creditors are not impaired, confirmation of a plan of adjustment raises no legal
issues. Indeed, the individual members of such a class do not vote. 186 Simi-
larly, confirmation is not difficult when all impaired classes vote to accept a
plan. The considerable utility of bankruptcy reorganization or adjustment
lies in its ability to bind dissenters; creditor consent to impairment need not
be unanimous. Creditors vote by class and a class is deemed to have voted
for a plan if more than one-half of its members holding two-thirds of the debt
vote in favor of the plan.187 The extraordinary power of plan confirmation
lies in its power to bind non-consenting members of a class when the class
votes in favor of the plan.' 88 Without the Bankruptcy Clause or its consent,
the rights of a minority cannot be affected by a majority.
A. CRAM-DOWN
The power of bankruptcy goes further yet. Even if all classes do not vote
for a plan, it may nonetheless be confirmed by cram-down .189 Several condi-
tions must be satisfied for a plan of adjustment to be crammed down. First,
the plan must comply with the incorporated requirements of section
1129(a).o90 Second, as in chapter 11, at least one class of impaired claims
must have voted in favor of the plan.' 9 ' Third, the court must find that the
treatment proposed by the plan is "fair and equitable" to members of the non-
consenting class. 192 Only bankruptcy fairness can justify a nonconsensual
plan that impairs a creditor's legal rights, so it is not surprising that the cram-
down provisions of bankruptcy law require heightened judicial solicitude for
the rights of the members of a non-consenting class.193
The requirement that a plan must be fair and equitable represents one-
half of the test of bankruptcy fairness. The rule that a plan be fair and equita-
ble focuses on allocating value that will be distributed under the plan to
classes of creditors in a way that is consistent with bankruptcy priorities. A
plan of adjustment must distribute the payments from a municipality in the
'See 11 U.S.C. § 901(a), incorporating sections 1126(c), 1126(), 1129(a)(2), 1129(a)(3), 1129(a)(6),
1129(a)(8), 1129(a)(10), 1129(b)(1), 1129(b)(2)(A), and 1129(b)(2)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code.
11611 U.S.C. § 1126(f).
.8711 U.S.C. § 1126(c).
'8811 U.S.C. § 944(a)(3).
'89JOAN N. FEENEY, BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL § 11:64 (5th ed. 2013).
'011 U.S.C. § 943.
11 U.S.C. §§ 901(a), 1129(a)(10).
19211 U.S.C. §§ 901(a), 1129(b)(1). See infra text accompanying notes 202-221.
193 David A. Skeel, Jr., State Bankruptcy from the Ground Up, in WHEN STATES Go BROKE 191, 199
(Peter Conti-Brown & David A. Skeel, Jr. eds. 2012) .
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order provided by the Bankruptcy Code or state-law priorities recognized by
the Code. The well-known absolute priority rule is simply a function of ap-
plying the fair and equitable test. As Bruce Markell puts it, 'Vertical expec-
tations are the province of the fair and equitable rule." Thus, secured
revenue bonds must be paid before unsecured general obligation bonds or
unsecured pension obligations. Paying claims with state-law priorities that
do not also enjoy Bankruptcy Code priority would violate the rule that pay-
ments under a plan that is crammed down must be fair and equitable.
Fourth, a plan may not "discriminate unfairly" if it is to be crammed
down over the objection of a dissenting class. The rule against unfair discrim-
ination represents the other half of the test of bankruptcy fairness. Combin-
ing both aspects of bankruptcy fairness, we see that while the fair and
equitable requirement implements vertical expectations of creditors, the un-
fair discrimination requirement implements their horizontal expectations. 194
Unfair discrimination is particularly significant in chapter 9 because the Su-
preme Court first applied this requirement in a chapter IX case in 1940.195
The prohibition of unfair discrimination makes it impossible to cram down a
plan that treats differently creditors with the same bankruptcy priority. All
unsecured creditors including holders of general obligation bonds as well as
retirees, to the extent their benefits are unfunded, must receive the same net
payments under a plan of adjustment. Bruce Markell suggests the following
test for the presence of unfair discrimination:
[A] court should not confirm a nonconsensual plan, even if it
provides fair and equitable treatment for all classes, when
there is: (1) a dissenting class; (2) another class of the same
priority; and (3) a difference in the plan's treatment of the
two classes that results in either (a) a materially lower per-
centage recovery for the dissenting class . . . or (b) . . . an
allocation under the plan of materially greater risk to the
dissenting class .... 196
Paying retirees a greater percentage of their unsecured claims than general
obligation bondholders could not, without the consent of the class of bond-
holders, be confirmed.
Next, what is implicit in section 1129(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Code197 is
194 Bruce A. Markell, A New Perspective on Unfair Discrimination in Chapter 11, 72 AMER. BANKR. L.
J. 227, 247 (1998).
'
9
'American United Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. City of Avon Park, 311 U.S. 138 (1940).
'
9 6Markell, supra note 194, at 249.
19711 U.S.C. § 1129:
(a) The court shall confirm a plan only if all of the following requirements are met:
(7) With respect to each impaired class of claims or interests-
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made explicit in chapter 9: a plan cannot be confirmed unless it "is in the best
interests of creditors."9 8 The impossibility of liquidation of a municipality as
an alternative to its reorganization entails this requirement and no plan that
fails this test may be confirmed.199 Finally, a sixth provision of chapter 9
must be satisfied: implementation of the plan cannot be prohibited by law. 2 0 0
B. IN FOR A PENNY, IN FOR A POUND: Two ASPECTS OF
BANKRUPTCY FAIRNESS
The fairness at issue in chapter 9 is primarily substantive. Substantive
fairness in bankruptcy is not a roving commission to right prebankruptcy
wrongs. 20 1 Bankruptcy fairness is not about reallocating risk. Instead, it safe-
guards vertical and horizontal expectations with respect to priority by insur-
ing a plan is both "fair and equitable" and does not "discriminate unfairly."
Creditors with a higher bankruptcy priority must be paid before those with a
lower priority and with respect to those with the same priority, the plan
must implement the principle of pari passu. Creditors of the same bankruptcy
priority receive the same ratable distribution.202 In other words, unless oth-
erwise recognized by the Bankruptcy Code, state law priorities are pre-
empted by bankruptcy fairness.203 If either aspect of the notion of
bankruptcy fairness does not accord with a state's preferred priorities, the
state is free to withdraw its consent to municipal bankruptcy.
(A) each holder of a claim or interest of such class-
(i) has accepted the plan; or
(ii) will receive or retain under the plan on account of such claim or
interest property of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, that is
not less than the amount that such holder would so receive or retain if
the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7 of this title on such date;
Section 901 does not incorporate this section because municipalities cannot be liquidated.
19811 U.S.C. § 943(b)(7). See infra text accompanying notes 222-229.
19See generally 6 ALAN N. RESNICK & HENRY J. SOMMER, EDS., COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
943.03[7][a] (16th ed. 2013):
A municipality cannot be liquidated, its assets sold, and the proceeds used to pay its
creditors. Nevertheless, the concept [of best interests] is not without meaning in a
municipal debt adjustment case. The concept should be interpreted to mean that
the plan must be better than the alternative that creditors have.
2001l U.S.C. § 943 ("The court shall confirm the plan if- .. . (4) the debtor is not prohibited by law
from taking any action necessary to carry out the plan."); see infra text accompanying notes 230-235.
201See C. Scott Pryor, Third Time's the Charm: The Coming Impact of the Restatement (Third) Resti-
tution and Unjust Enrichment in Bankruptcy, 40 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 843, 844-46 (2013) (explaining that
equity in the common law tradition has a discrete and statable meaning).
202Id. at 851 ("[T]he principle of pan passu requires that all similarly situated creditors of a debtor be
accorded equal treatment."). See also Skeel, supra note 193, at 197 (identifying 'comparable treatment for
similarly situated creditors" as one of five core principles of any bankruptcy system).
203But see Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Normative Theory of Bankruptcy Law. Bankruptcy As (Is) Civil
Procedure, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 931 (2004) (arguing there should not be any bankruptcy-specific
distributional provisions).
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The dispute over whether a state's reserved Tenth Amendment rights
are waived in favor of Congress' Article I powers was addressed in the case
of Stockton's immediate predecessor in California municipal bankruptcy, the
City of Vallejo. The plan of adjustment ultimately confirmed in Vallejo's
case modified collectively bargained agreements with current employees, re-
duced benefits promised to retirees, cut accrued interest due on the city's
bond debt, and reduced the rate of interest on those bonds going forward.204
In contrast with Stockton, Vallejo began its case by seeking to reject its
current collective bargaining agreements. Vallejo's unions resisted the city's
motion on a straightforward basis: California law prohibited it. As inter-
preted by California courts, the state's Meyers-Milias-Brown Act 20s did not
permit pre-expiration unilateral termination of public sector collective bar-
gaining agreements.206 The bankruptcy court nonetheless found California
law preempted by section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code207 and on appeal the
district court affirmed the city's power to reject.208 Vallejo and its unions
subsequently engaged in negotiations that culminated in new collective bar-
gaining agreements that the city asserted would save it $34 million over two
years. 209
Vallejo's retired employees, however, objected to any reduction in their
benefits even if the decrease was part of a new collective bargaining agree-
ment. The retirees' position was also grounded in well-established state
law.2 10 The court-appointed retirees' committee sued Vallejo in bankruptcy
court for an injunction preventing any reduction in payments but the court
concluded that the committee lacked standing and dismissed the action.21'
The retirees then filed claims for unpaid benefits to which Vallejo objected.
The bankruptcy court sustained the city's objections, holding that the retir-
ees had no claims for benefit reductions so long as the retirees would be paid
pursuant to the new collective bargaining agreements. 212 In short, both em-
ployees and retirees found themselves subject to the powers afforded a debtor
under bankruptcy law notwithstanding clear state law protections.
204See Vallejo's Second Amended Plan for the Adjustment of Debts at 26-31, 35-36, No. 08-26813
(Bankr. E.D. Cal. May 20, 2011), ECF No. 1044 (impairing the claims of its bondholders).
20 SCAL. Gov. CODE §§ 3500-11.
206See, e.g., Glendale City Emps. Assn. v. City of Glendale, 540 P.2d 609, 615 (1975) (describing
collective bargaining agreements as "indubitably binding").
207in re City of Vallejo, 403 B.R. 72(Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2009).
20
alnt'1 Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. City of Vallejo (In re City of Vallejo), 432 B.R. 262 (E.D. Cal. 2010).
2
"See Disclosure Statement with Respect to Second Amended Plan for the Adjustment of Debts of
City of Vallejo ('Vallejo Disclosure Statement") at 16, No. 08-26813 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. May 20, 2011),
ECF No.1045.
2ioSee supra text accompanying notes 34-37.
21'Motion/Application for Order Appointing Unions as Retiree Benefit Representatives for Retirees
from their Work Units, No. 08-26813 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. July 25, 2008), ECF No. 189.
212No. 08-26813 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2011), ECF Nos.1078-1090.
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With less litigation than with its employees and retirees, Vallejo and its
bondholders agreed to reductions in interest and principal obligations.213
The holder of the largest amount of Vallejo's securities agreed to reduce the
present value of its claim by over 40%.214 While precise comparison of the
reductions of employees, retirees, and bondholders is difficult, it is clear all
shared in the costs of Vallejo's financial distress. In other words, the plan did
not discriminate unfairly; the principle of pari passu was honored.215 Bank-
ruptcy law priorities, not state law alternatives, filled in the content of bank-
ruptcy fairness.
Financial implementation of bankruptcy fairness will typically assume the
form of shared pain.21 6 What is shared from an economic perspective is the
realization of the risk of insolvency. Allocation of risk only to retirees and
recipients of services is not fair.21 7 Neither is shifting the entire burden to
bondholders. Unfunded retiree benefits, even when protected by state
law,218 have no bankruptcy priority over the claims of bondholders. 2 19 Nor
do bondholders over retirees. Regardless of state-law fairness, a court may
dismiss the chapter 9 case if it concludes that a plan sought to be crammed
down does not comport with bankruptcy fairness. 2 20 An agenda of protect-
ing those least able to diversify their risk is understandable. It is not, how-
ever, consistent with bankruptcy fairness.
Bankruptcy fairness can be ascribed to the results in Vallejo because all
stakeholders realized some of the risk of insolvency. Thus, the result in Cen-
tral Falls is unfair because one set of stakeholders bore none of the risk of
insolvency, and can be justified only because all of the parties negotiated to a
consensual plan. Certainly the state law that created the preferred status of
bondholders casts a long and dark shadow over the negotiating process but
the retirees impaired by Rhode Island's grant to bondholders could have re-
2
'See Vallejo Disclosure Statement, supra note 209, at 37-46.
2'41d. at 38.
"'See Skeel, supra note 26, at 1070-71 ("Bankruptcy's 'equality of creditors' norm, which requires that
similarly situation creditors receive generally similar treatment, would make it much more likely that other
constituencies [bondholders] would share the burden."). While Skeel uses the term equality to describe
this principle of bankruptcy, I prefer the term substantive fairness because it incorporates both vertical
and horizontal fairness.
"
6Bankruptcy fairness has been deemed to require a municipality to raise taxes only once. See Fano v.
Newport Heights Irrigation Dist., 114 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1940) (applying chapter IX of the Bankruptcy
Act). See also In re Sullivan Cnty. Reg'I Refuse Disposal Dist., 165 BR. 60 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1994).
S17 ee Skeel, supra note 96, at 702 ("Two constituencies in particular have been asked to bear a
disproportionate percentage of the sacrifice during the recent crisis: the state's public employees and the
recipients-especially the poor and lower middle class recipients-of its services.").
2
"See supra text accompanying notes 34-37 (summarizing California law).
"
9See Skeel, supra note 96, at 692 ("[I]n bankruptcy, pension beneficiaries' claims might well be
protected only up to the amount of funds actually set aside for their payment. . . . [P]ension promises
would be general unsecured claims in a bankruptcy . . . .").
22oSee 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (incorporating by reference § 1129(b)(1)).
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fused to accept the plan. Whether the court in Central Falls would have
crammed down the plan over the objection of retirees will never be known.
The same uncertainty holds in any other case in which retirees enjoy a state-
law priority that is not recognized in the Bankruptcy Code. Would the court
cram down a plan implementing state law protection of vested pensions over
the objection of the bondholders like Stockton's capital markets creditors? If
so, cram-down would be an example of state law serving "as a mechanism for
carrying out particular agendas under the cover of judicial robes."221 Non-
consensual reallocations of the effects of the risk of nonpayment inevitably
will be seen as political but the bankruptcy question is whose politics will
prevail?
C. WHOSE FAIRNESS? WHOSE JUSTICE?: STATE-LAw FAIRNESS
THROUGH THE BACK DOOR
While the absolute priority rule and the principle of pari passu vindicate
bankruptcy fairness, chapter 9 also requires that a plan be in the "best inter-
ests" of creditors. This requirement forces a comparison of a plan's proposed
state of affairs to the "what if" of state law resolution. In other words, the
best interests test aims to vindicate state-law fairness. The antecedents of
section 943(b)(7)-the statutory source of the best interests test-are found
in section 1129(a)(7). Briefly, this section provides that even if a creditor's
class votes for a plan, an individual dissenter must be assured of receiving at
least what would have been collected had the debtor been liquidated.222 A
creditor's best interests cannot be served if reorganization provides less than
the worst case of chapter 7 liquidation.
Yet, comparison to liquidation under chapter 7 does not function in a
chapter 9 bankruptcy because municipal debtors cannot be liquidated. It is
thus no surprise that section 1129(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Code is not incor-
porated into chapter 9. Instead, section 943(b)(7) simply mandates that to be
confirmed a plan of adjustment must be in the best interests of creditors but
without a baseline of comparison. Chapter 9's best interests test thus begs
the question: By what standard are creditors' best interests to be measured?
The scope of best interests of creditors under chapter 9 is largely unmap-
ped and the legislative history refers to only two cases.223 In the first, the
Ninth Circuit had denied confirmation to an asset-rich irrigation district that
refused to raise taxes to pay its unsecured creditors in full 224 while in the
other the Supreme Court reversed approval of a plan where the lower court
simply had made no finding on the unused taxing power of a drainage dis-
221Levitin, supra note 83, at 1450.
22211 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii).
223124 CONo. REc. 32,403 (Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards).
224Fano v. Newport Heights Irrigation Dist., 114 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1940).
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trict.2 2 5 Summarizing the import of this scanty data, Frederick Tung suggests
that in chapter 9 the best interests test is satisfied when creditors receive "at
least what they would have received by virtue of a mandamus proceeding
under state law to compel an increased tax levy" to pay a municipality's
debt.22 6 A recent California bankruptcy decision applied the best interests
test leniently, holding that a hospital district was not obliged to raise taxes to
pay its creditors more than its plan provided.227 Indeed, contemporary courts
generally give little weight to the best interests test because either, as in
California, the ability to raise taxes is highly constrained 228 or because the
interests of a dissenting creditor were not representative of its class.2 29 A
plan in a high-profile case that proposes to cram down creditors who have
different state law priorities would force courts to examine the best interests
test more critically.
Adam Levitin goes further and argues that the best interests standard
trumps bankruptcy fairness, at least that aspect of bankruptcy fairness pro-
tected by the prohibition of unfair discrimination. Levitin suggests that the
failure of chapter 9 to incorporate a federal priority scheme implies that state
priorities should control bankruptcy fairness. In other words, the absence of
a chapter 9 priority scheme must be filled with something and state law
priorities are ready at hand. But chapter 9 does provide a priority scheme in
both the vertical sense-fair and equitable-and the horizontal sense-unfair
discrimination. Contrary to Levitin's argument, the failure to incorporate the
priority provisions of sections 725, 725, and 507 of the Bankruptcy Code
means only that those statutory deviations from bankruptcy fairness do not
apply in chapter 9. Indeed, equality is the baseline that silence does not dis-
place. Bankruptcy fairness preempts state-law priorities yet the tension be-
tween the two standards of substantive fairness remains unresolved. After
all, chapter 9 requires that a plan must be measured against both bankruptcy
and state-law fairness to be confirmed-unless the creditors whose interests
are in conflict consent.
D. ADJUSTMENT ACCORDING To LAW
There is an additional statutory complication on the road to conformation
225Kelley v. Everglades Drainage Dist., 319 U.S. 415 (1943).
226Frederick Tung, After Orange County: Reforming California Municipal Bankruptcy Law, 53 HAS-
TINGs L.J. 885, 899 n.69 (2002). See generally Jeff B. Fordham, Methods of Enforcing Satisfaction of Obliga-
tions of Public Corporations, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 28 (1933).
227In re Corcoran Hosp. Dist., 233 B.R. 449, 459 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1999) (holding alternatively that
raising tax assessments would be futile and that there was no requirement to do so).
228See supra text accompanying notes 24-25.
9See, e.g., In re Connector 2000 Ass'n, Inc., 447 B.R. 752, 764, 770 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2011) (overruling
single, late-filed objection to confirmation where all impaired classes had overwhelmingly accepted the
plan).
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of a chapter 9 plan. The bankruptcy fairness component of cram-down en-
tails creditor equality. The best interests test resuscitates the question of
state-law fairness. The application of section 943(b)(4) of the Bankruptcy
Code is not clear. What does it mean for a court to confirm a plan only if a
municipality "is not prohibited by law from taking any action necessary to
carry out the plan"?2 3 0 Is "not prohibited by law" backward-looking? Does it
prohibit a plan whose distributions would be inconsistent with state-law fair-
ness? If so, bankruptcy fairness may be disregarded if state law so requires.
Or is "not prohibited by law" forward-looking, referring only to what is done
under the plan post-confirmation?
As with chapter 9's best interests test, the "not prohibited by law" stan-
dard is underdeveloped. In the leading case, confirmation was denied where
the plan would have paid impaired creditors by newly issued instruments
that did not comply with state law. Thus, the bankruptcy court in Nebraska
refused to confirm a plan in Sanitary &Improvement Dist. # 723 1 because it
would create the possibility that bondholders under the plan could be paid
less than warrant holders, which the court found to be contrary to Nebraska
law: "Since state law requires full payment to bondholders, and since a plan
cannot be confirmed if it permits a debtor to do something that is prohibited
by state law, it cannot be confirmed."232 The holding did not, however, pro-
hibit the impairment of the claims of prebankruptcy bondholders even though
their payment was similarly mandated; Nebraska law had not changed while
the case was pending. With respect to this concern, the court simply noted
that there would be little utility to chapter 9 if any distribution inconsistent
with state law rendered it non-confirmable.233 Section 943(b)(4) therefore
meant that implementation of the plan must comply with state law; it did not
mean that a plan cannot alter obligations enjoying state-law priority.234
Plans of arrangement have value because they bind dissenters but that power
makes sense only if dissenters can be bound to something other than what
state law already requires. The Bankruptcy Code's mandate that a plan com-
23011 U.S.C. § 943(b)(4).
3
'In re Sanitary & Imp. Dist., # 7, 98 B.R. 970 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1989).
2 2Id. at 974.
"In re Cnty. of Orange, 191 B.R. 1005, 1021 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996) ("Chapter 9 does not permit
individual states to override the priority scheme that is inherent in the Code."). See also Sanitary Dist., #
7, 98 B.R. at 974 ("If a municipality were required to pay prepetition bondholders the full amount of their
claim with interest as contained on the face of the bonds and the SID had no ability to impair the bond,
holder claims over objection, the whole purpose and structure of Chapter 9 would be of little value.").
134See Sanitary Dist., # 7, 98 B.R. at 974 ("The Bankruptcy Code permits modification of bondholder
rights. The Bankruptcy Code permits an issuance of new bonds . . .. However, those 'new bonds' simply
become a substitute for the original obligation and they must be issued in conformance with state law
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ply with the law is thus unrelated to either bankruptcy fairness or state-law
fairness.
A plan may be confirmed when creditors enjoying priority under state
law will be impaired. Indeed, to grant such creditors priority in bankruptcy
would be an example of unfair discrimination. 2 35 Yet, a plan may not be
confirmed that provides those creditors with less than they could recover
outside bankruptcy; it is not in their best interests. And, perhaps regrettably,
the "not prohibited by law" standard is not a tie breaker. This is the conun-
drum that creates the game of Chicken and drives stakeholders to compro-
mise or face dismissal.
E. OUT OF BANKRUPTCY
Just as the bankruptcy court must evaluate a municipality's eligibility to
be in chapter 9, it has the power to dismiss a case. 2 36 Dismissal returns to the
political process the distributional impact of the risk of a municipality's insol-
vency. Such a return may satisfy creditors like retirees in the short run but
would certainly raise the cost of municipal finance in in a state where such
state-law priorities trumped bankruptcy fairness. Similarly, the bondholders
of a city like Central Falls would have continued to enjoy the benefits of
their newly acquired collateral had the court dismissed the case. But even
there the political winners would have experienced subsequent costs. Having
a lien or statutory priority is not the same as getting paid. Had the impaired
retirees not voted to approve the plan of Central Falls, the bondholders
would have needed to resort to legally uncharted waters to divert the city's
general revenues to payment of its securities. Government official have
shown that they are adept at avoiding even judicial orders to raise taxes.237
If outside bankruptcy California cities like Stockton were to make the
political choice to default on pension assessments, CalPERS could impose a
punitive termination liability secured by a lien on all the assets of the city.238
Yet CalPERS cannot force a city to raise taxes or cut services; it can only
force diversion of payments otherwise due to bondholders. The negative ef-
fects of grossly disproportionate treatment of retirees and bondholders on the
ability of other California municipalities to use the bond market could be
significant. Even creditors with strong state-law protections cannot be as-
sured of payment outside bankruptcy. Municipal insolvency is generally a
function of fiscal limitation rather than governmental gamesmanship.
235See supra text accompanying notes 219-221.
23611 U.S.C. § 930.
"
31See Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502, 510 (1942) ("[T]he right to
enforce claims against the city through mandamus is the empty right to litigate.").
238See supra text accompanying note 18.
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Bankruptcy, especially municipal bankruptcy, is a political exercise. 23 9
And the politics of chapter 9 are an amalgam of state law entitlements and
bankruptcy fairness. A bankruptcy court need not insert itself in an intracta-
ble effort to resolve two sets of incommensurable values. Instead, the court
should hold out the threat of dismissal that would leave the parties to their
political and legal devices. Even if the contending parties cannot reach agree-
ment, the effects of dismissal are not as permanent as what befell Buzz
Gunderson.240
When confronted with the choice between a consensual plan and the
vagaries of state law, one can expect a compromise. In other words, chapter
9 operates as a federally-sponsored forum for a game of Chicken.2 41 Two cars
racing toward each other are the prototypical format for the game of
Chicken. The first driver to turn aside is a "chicken" or coward. 2 42 The
winner who has driven straight ahead is confirmed in his vainglory. Of
course, if neither turns aside both drivers die, albeit with a reputation for
extraordinary toughness. In chapter 9, the sociopathy of two players of
Chicken who would rather die than swerve are replaced by the rational cal-
culators of bond insurers and representatives of retirees. Even though the
judgment of sophisticated parties can be wrong, the possibility of a prece-
dent-setting loss should be enough to cause at least one party to stop before
the brink.2 43
Thus, extrapolating from game theory to bankruptcy law, the conflicting
confirmation requirements of bankruptcy fairness and state-law fairness pro-
duce a system that no stakeholder prefers. All are effectively in the minority
when faced with the real possibility that a court could confirm a plan that
implements one standard at the expense of the other. The parties are further
encouraged to settle because, unlike litigators who retain the cumulative gain
of repeated games of Chicken, a single loss by either bondholders or retirees
239Levitin, supra note 83, at 1453.
240See REBEL WITHOUT A CAUSE (Warner Brothers 1955) (featuring classic "chickie run" scene re-
sulting in plunge to the death of character Buzz Gunderson that features in much game theoretical analysis
of game of Chicken).
24 1See generally ANDREW M. COLMAN, GAME THEORY AND ITS APPLICATIONS IN THE SOCIAL AND
BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES 111-15 (2nd ed. 1995) (analyzing game of Chicken).
242See David Crump, Came Theory, Legislation, and the Multiple Meanings of Equality, 38 HARV. J.
ON LEGIs. 331, 368 (2001). See also Maxwell L. Stearns & Todd J. Zywicki, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS
AND APPLICATIONS IN LAW 214-18 (2009) (describing basic game of Chicken with additional insights of
"non-myopic" equilibrium alternatives).
24 3lndeed, rational calculations have prompted Stockton and its capital markets creditors to compro-
mise. See First Amended Plan for the Adjustment of Debts of City of Stockton, In re City of Stockton,
No. 12-32118 (November 15, 2013), ECF No. 1204. Stockton's Plan does not impair the pension claims of
its retirees but proposes to pay the capital markets creditors more than general unsecured creditors.
Claims for Stockton's rejection of its prepetition obligation to pay retiree health benefits are among the
city's general unsecured creditors.
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would affect the legal landscape for many other cases. Bondholders legiti-
mately fear that a court could recognize the state-law priorities for retirees,
and retirees should be concerned that pari passu would equalize their recov-
eries with ordinary creditors. Pressing for total victory runs the risk of com-
plete loss. Thus, as long as there is a consensual plan in which all parties
share the risks of municipal insolvency that is less bad than the alternative-
dismissal-the incommensurable rules of chapter 9 will have served a socially
useful purpose.
V. CONCLUSION
Neither the ineliminable risk of nonpayment nor state law allocations of
that risk should control confirmation of a plan of adjustment. For better or
worse, Congress has made clear its policy choices by failing to subject issu-
ance of municipal securities to substantial regulatory scrutiny, by granting
blanket enforceability to pre-bankruptcy municipal liens and security inter-
ests, by requiring any plan to be in the best interests of creditors, and by
providing a distributional ordering of pari passu. A bankruptcy court must
evaluate whether a plan is in the best interests of creditors by comparing its
projection to what would happen under state law, i.e., state-law fairness.
Conversely, a bankruptcy court must also evaluate a plan's substantive fair-
ness in terms of bankruptcy law, in particular, the prohibition of unfair dis-
crimination. A bankruptcy court no less than Congress and state
legislators-which together have created conflicting and perverse incen-
tives-is subject to political bias. Leaving uncorrected what a judge may
believe is an unfair initial allocation of risk is the best that can be done. 2 44
Unless, of course, the parties can agree.
Bankruptcy fairness and creditor best interests have bite to the extent a
plan fails to distribute payments according to bankruptcy law and the plan
clearly leaves some creditors with less than would have been the case outside
bankruptcy. Dismissal is the appropriate remedy when the stakeholders can-
not agree on a plan that unfairly discriminates or fails the test of creditor best
interests.
A court should not authorize actions taken while a case is pending that
would create "facts on the ground" directing a plan's distributions free from a
finding of bankruptcy fairness. A revitalized prohibition of creeping confir-
mation is in order where a municipal debtor proposes to assume a contract
that creates unfair discrimination. The court should preserve as much flexi-
bility as possible to drive the parties to an unhappy consensus. Chapter 9
244See Gillette, supra note 79, at 296 ("None of this denies that courts may suffer from their own
biases in evaluating a municipality's financial position. Trying to determine the incentive structure of
judicial decisions is a notoriously difficult task.").
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should be deployed not simply as a rule but as an entire system that penalizes
recalcitrance.
Substantive fairness is not a metaphysical standard. It need only be the
worst state of affairs all parties can accept. So too, state law entitlements are
simply the baselines from which the parties find their way to yes. The pur-
pose of chapter 9 is not to reallocate the risk assigned by contract and state
law. Chapter 9 exists to provide a forum in which the stakeholders can agree
on how the effects of that risk can be borne. Substantive unfairness precedes
bankruptcy and cram-down remains when the parties cannot agree on how
far to bend chapter 9's distributional norms. Yet, even with cram-down the
court must conclude that a plan comports with the principles of bankruptcy
fairness and creditor best interests. The standard of fairness does not require
absolute equality and the test of best interests does not require perfect con-
sistency. Dismissal is the appropriate response if the discrepancies are too
great. And dismissal-or its credible threat-will drive the parties-as they
have driven Stockton and its capital markets creditors-to agree.
